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Abstract
This paper studies the impact of distortions in the access to international capital markets on
competition and productivity. I show that a reduction in these distortions leads to an increase in
aggregate productivity through two different channels. First, firms that were previously credit
constrained respond to better financing terms by increasing their investment in technology, a
reallocation effect. Second, non-constrained firms also expand their investment in technology
because of increased competition, a pro-competitive effect. I provide evidence for these two
channels using firm-level census data from the deregulation of international financial flows in
Hungary.
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1 Introduction
International financial integration has been traditionally viewed as an engine of growth leading to a
more efficient allocation of capital across countries and accelerating the convergence of developing
economies. Yet financial crises in emerging markets during the nineties challenged this view and
led to a reassessment of the benefits of capital account liberalization. Scholars and policy makers
started to consider the possibility of, and even advocate, capital controls to reduce the extent of
international financial integration. This paper assesses the impact of financial liberalization on
firms’ access to external finance and its implications for market competition and economic growth.
This paper shows that capital controls can create asymmetric access to capital markets across
firms, which distorts competition and economy-wide incentives to innovate. I start by showing
theoretically that, provided financial development is sufficiently high, financial liberalization leads
to aggregate productivity growth through two different channels. First, it improves financing terms
and encourages firms that were previously credit constrained to invest in technology, a reallocation
effect. Second, it tightens product market competition and induces non-constrained firms to do the
same, a pro-competitive effect. Next, I empirically test these two channels using firm-level census
data from the period covering the deregulation of international financial flows in Hungary. This
reform revoked capital controls that had imposed asymmetric access to international borrowing
across firms. This pre-reform asymmetry between discriminated firms –those that, by law, were
previously shut out of international credit markets– and non-discriminated firms allows me to
identify the effects of financial liberalization across firms. The empirical results support the view
that financial liberalization can lead to a reduction in asymmetric access to external finance across
firms, which deepens competition and promotes a broad-based increase in firms’ investment in
technology. This paper provides, for the first time, firm-level evidence for the micro-mechanisms
underpinning the substantial increases in aggregate productivity that follow financial liberalization
episodes, a robust correlation previously documented in a large cross-country literature.
To guide my empirical work, I develop a small open economy model in which capital controls
create asymmetric access to capital markets across firms that affects the tightness of competition
and investment in technology. The model shows that the impact of financial liberalization on
capital-scarce economies depends on the local level of financial development. If financial develop-
ment is sufficiently high, a reduction in capital controls leads to capital inflows and a decrease in
the domestic interest rate that reduces asymmetric access to external finance across firms. Finan-
cial liberalization promotes aggregate productivity growth through two channels. Discriminated
firms innovate more because the reduction in the domestic interest rate raises their post-innovation
profits. Non-discriminated firms also innovate more because increased competition raises their in-
cremental profits from innovating. In this case, financial liberalization is associated with capital
inflows, deeper competition, and aggregate productivity growth. If financial development is low,
however, a reduction in capital controls leads to capital outflows and to an increase in asymmetric
access to capital markets across firms, which undermines competition and economy-wide investment
in technology.
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I next use the deregulation of international financial flows in Hungary in 2001 to test the model’s
qualitative implications. A key feature of the period before the liberalization is that capital controls
had distorted the access to international borrowing across firms. This feature allows me to identify
the effect of the reform within Hungary. In particular, capital controls restricted domestic firms
to borrow locally in a tight credit market while allowing foreign firms to raise funds abroad and,
thus, circumvent the low credit in the Hungarian financial system. In 2001, all capital controls
were lifted and, with them, the ban on domestic firms’ international borrowing. In my empirical
analysis, I exploit this asymmetric access to international funds between domestic and foreign firms
prior to the liberalization as a first source of cross-sectional variation. I complement this analysis
by adding a second source of cross-sectional variation –differential needs for external finance at the
sector level– and test whether the liberalization affected firms differentially as a function of their
sectoral exposure to the reform.
The firm-level census data that I analyze (APEH, a database from the Statistical Department
of the National Bank of Hungary) provides information on firms’ balance sheets reported to tax
authorities for all manufacturing firms during the period 1992-2008. This extensive database al-
lows me to build comprehensive firm-level measures of productivity, capital, and use of external
finance over a long panel. It constitutes an advance over previous studies in the financial liberal-
ization literature that focused only on small samples of large and publicly listed firms. In addition,
I complement my analysis with the Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Surveys
(BEEPS) of the World Bank and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, which
report direct information on firms’ R&D, innovation activities, and financing terms.
In my empirical analysis, I first document that capital controls in Hungary were associated with
a low level of credit as well as worse financing conditions and lower leverage for domestic firms, even
after controlling for firm-observable characteristics. The liberalization of capital controls in 2001 led
to large capital inflows and to an expansion in the local credit supply that substantially improved
financing terms for these firms. By 2004, the difference in the interest rate paid by domestic and
foreign firms had fallen five-fold, and the difference in the required collateral had dropped four-fold.
This improvement in financing terms was associated with a 23% increase in domestic firms’ leverage
and a reallocation of credit towards these firms, whose share of aggregate credit increased by 17
percentage points.
I then assess whether this reduction in capital market distortions is consistent with reallocation
towards domestic firms. In line with this first channel, I demonstrate that, while prior to the
financial liberalization, domestic and foreign firms’ growth rates were not statistically different,
following the reform, domestic firms started growing much faster. In particular, I find that domestic
firms differentially increase their capital intensity (25%), labor productivity (5%), revenue TFP
(RTFP) (3%), and probability of conducting R&D and innovation activities (9 and 12 percentage
points).1 In line with the easing of financing terms, this expansion is greater in sectors where
1It is important to differentiate revenue TFP from physical TFP. Unfortunately, given the lack of information on
firms’ prices, I am only able to measure RTFP. See also Foster, Haltiwanger, and Syverson (2008).
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domestic firms had greater needs for external finance. Notably, domestic firms differentially increase
their leverage as a function of sectoral financial needs.
Additionally, my results point to the second, pro-competitive, channel. First, foreign firms’
markups decreased by 3% relative to domestic firms. Second, this decline is larger in sectors that
have greater needs for external finance, which are sectors where competition was initially more
distorted, as domestic firms were more affected by the asymmetric access to capital markets. I find
that one standard deviation increase in the index of financial dependence decreases foreign firms’
markups by 6%. Third, I also show that foreign firms increased their labor productivity, RTFP,
and skill intensity as a function of sector dependence on external finance. Importantly, they did not
increase their capital intensity nor their leverage. This suggests that these firms were not initially
credit constrained but were responding to the tighter competition of domestic firms in those sectors.
Finally, at the industry level, I find that the greater expansion of domestic firms led to reductions
in industry concentration and in productivity and markup dispersion within sectors.
The expansion in firms’ productivity resulted in an increase in aggregate productivity growth.
Notably, the source of this growth completely reversed following the liberalization. Prior to the
reform, within-firm productivity explained only 17% of aggregate productivity growth, but after
the reform, within-firm productivity explained 82% of aggregate productivity growth. This upsurge
in the within-firm component is consistent with the mechanism proposed in this paper, arguing for
the pro-competitive forces of financial liberalization that led all firms to increase their productivity.
The empirical identification of the effect of the financial liberalization is based on the asymmetric
access to international borrowing between domestic and foreign firms prior to the reform. To test
that the observed effects correspond to the liberalization and not something else, I conduct a full
set of robustness tests. First, I estimate the effects by year and show that the differential response
of domestic and foreign firms coincides with the timing of the reform, as the estimated coefficients
do not vary prior to the liberalization, while they monotonically change following it. Second, I
demonstrate that the results are not driven by sector-specific trends, as they are robust to including
four-digit sector pre-reform growth trends and sector-year fixed effects. Third, the general context
around the liberalization and its timing minimizes reverse causality concerns, as it was part of a
general program of fourteen transition economies to join the European Union (EU). Importantly,
by 2001, the deregulation of capital controls in Hungary was the only missing requirement to
join the EU. The Hungarian economy was already deeply integrated with the EU, and trade and
foreign direct investment (FDI) flows remained constant in the years prior to and following the
liberalization. Notably, I do not find any differential pattern of growth between exporter and non-
exporter firms. Additionally, I also show that other transition economies undergoing the same
process of joining the EU but with already deregulated financial accounts did not witness the same
pattern of capital inflows observed in Hungary.
This paper adds to a long literature on the relationship between international financial inte-
gration and economic growth in developing countries (Gertler and Rogoff 1990; Gourinchas and
Jeanne 2006; Mendoza, Quadrini, and Rios-Rull 2009; and Levchenko, Ranciere, and Thoenig 2009,
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among others). It illustrates that, in capital-scarce economies, the impact of financial liberalization
depends on the local level of financial development. If financial development is sufficiently high,
capital openness induces inflows as well as higher innovation, market competition, and economic
growth. If financial development is low, however, financial liberalization leads to outflows and to
lower investment and growth. This paper also relates to cross-country studies associating financial
liberalization with increases in aggregate productivity.2 Bonfiglioli (2008), Bekaert, Harvey, and
Lundblad (2011), and Chari, Henry, and Sasson (2012) find a positive impact of financial liber-
alization on aggregate productivity over the five years following a reform. This paper proposes a
mechanism that can explain the increase in aggregate productivity found in these cross-country
studies and uses firm-level census data from a particular reform to test it. This paper also informs
the debate on the impact of capital controls in developing economies and shows that these con-
trols can create asymmetric access to capital markets across firms, which undermines competition,
investment in technology, and economic growth.3
This paper is also related to the misallocation literature emphasizing how firm-level distortions
can lower aggregate productivity (Restuccia and Rogerson 2008; Hsieh and Klenow 2009; Peters
2013; and Restuccia and Rogerson 2013). This paper is closest to Peters (2013), who shows that
these distortions can affect both the static allocation of resources and firms’ dynamic innovation
incentives. My paper departs from Peters’ (2013) in that I identify in the data a particular policy
distortion and study how this distortion affects competition and all firms’ innovation incentives.
Focusing on access to capital markets, Gopinath, Kalemli-Ozcan, Karabarbounis, and Villegas-
Sanchez (2017) report large productivity losses from misallocation due to financial frictions. Addi-
tionally, Midrigan and Xu (2014) show that financial frictions can preclude credit-constrained firms
from adopting more efficient technologies. This paper shows that the effect of financial frictions on
productivity can be amplified through pro-competitive forces, which undermine both constrained
and non-constrained firms’ incentives to invest in technology. This view is complementary to that
developed by Edmond, Midrigan, and Xu (2015), who uncovered large pro-competitive effects from
a removal of another distortion in a trade liberalization reform.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, I present the model that
guides the empirical work. Section 3 describes the liberalization of international financial flows in
Hungary. Section 4 presents the data. In Section 5, I discuss the identification strategy and test
the model’s qualitative implications. Section 6 concludes.
2In a similar vein, several studies show a positive relationship between financial deepening and productivity
enhancements. In particular, they find that countries with more developed financial systems enjoy higher rates of
productivity growth. See, for example, King and Levine (1993a); King and Levine (1993b); Benhabib and Spiegel
(2000); and Beck, Levine, and Loayza (2000).
3See, for example, Forbes (2007a); Forbes (2007b); Desai, Foley, and Hines (2006); Devereux and Yetman (2014);
and Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2016), who discuss the impact of capital controls on countries.
4
2 Model
This section develops a small open economy model to study the impact of distortions in the access
to international capital markets on competition and aggregate productivity. The model has three
main ingredients. First, there are domestic and foreign firms that engage in R&D and produce
in oligopolistic markets. Second, there is a local banking sector that has a low level of financial
development and affects the direction of capital flows upon the financial liberalization. Third, there
are capital controls that prevent local firms from accessing international funds. I employ the model
to study the impact of financial liberalization on competition and firms’ investment in technology.
Focusing on the case in which the liberalization leads to capital inflows, I derive qualitative im-
plications to test using data in Section 5. These implications are derived analytically in partial
equilibrium and are illustrated in general equilibrium using a numerical exercise in Appendix B.4.
2.1 Environment
Consider a small economy populated by an infinite sequence of overlapping generations, each of
which lives for two periods. The economy is composed of firms, workers, and banks. This overlap-
ping generations setting simplifies households’ saving decisions and focuses on the impact of capital
controls on market competition and on firms’ incentives to invest in technology. A final good is
an aggregate of a continuum of intermediate varieties. In each intermediate variety, domestic firms
compete with foreign producers. Domestic and foreign firms differ in their initial productivity and
access to capital markets. Labor is internationally immobile.
i) Firms’ Production and Innovation
-Production. Intermediate firms operate with a Cobb-Douglas function: f(q, k, l) = q kαl1−α,
where q, k, and l are productivity, capital, and labor, and α ∈ (0, 1). Capital fully depreciates after
production. Within each intermediate variety, a foreign and a home firm compete a` la Bertrand.
In equilibrium, only the firm with the lowest marginal cost is active in the variety. To deter entry,
this firm resorts to limiting pricing and sets its price equal to the marginal cost of its closest rival.4
-Innovation and Technology. Intermediate firms are heterogeneous in productivity and conduct
innovation activities in the first period to try to obtain a frontier technology. The innovation process
is stochastic and depends on the firm’s innovation efforts xs, where s = {H,F} denotes home and
foreign firms. If the firm gets a frontier technology in the variety, it produces in t+ 1; otherwise it
exits the market. For expositional simplicity, I assume that, in each variety, foreign firms enjoy a
higher initial productivity level, but home firms can leapfrog the technology frontier.5 Hence, in each
4The pro-competitive effects of financial liberalization are also present in other oligopolistic frameworks, as in
Devereux and Lee (2001), Atkeson and Burstein (2008) and Edmond, Midrigan, and Xu (2015), in which firms
compete by quantities in a Cournot setting. See Appendix B.6.
5The assumption that foreign firms are more productive than home firms is consistent with the empirical pattern
observed in Hungary prior to the reform, as shown in Section 5. Moreover, this is a common trait of developing
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intermediate variety, innovations can originate from two sources: either the foreign firm improves
the existing technology, or the home firm innovates and obtains a new state-of-the-art technology.6
Let the initial productivity of firm s in variety j be: qsj ≡ λ
nsj , where λ > 1 and nsj is the firm’s
technology level, which evolves as in a quality ladder. Express the initial productivity difference
between foreign and home firms in variety j as a function of the technological gap between them:
∆j ≡ nFj − nHj . Finally, consider an R&D technology such that if a firm aims for an innovation
effort of xsj , it needs to undertake Γ units of labor:
Γ(xFjt,∆j) = λ
−∆j
1
φ
x2Fjt
2
and Γ(xHjt) =
1
φ
x2Hjt
2
,
where φ denotes the efficiency of the innovation technology, and xsjt ∈ (0, 1) are firms’ endogenous
innovation probabilities. As in Klette and Kortum (2004), Atkeson and Burstein (2010), and Peters
(2013), I let more efficient firms have lower innovation costs to account for the empirical finding that
innovation efforts are constant for large firms. As in Peters (2013), I assume that the innovation
of foreign firms is easier when their technological advantage is greater, i.e. λ−∆. This assumption
simplifies the exposition and does not affect the model’s implications (as shown in Appendix B.7).
Firms take the innovation efforts of other agents and factor prices as given.
The final good aggregates a continuum of measure one of j intermediate varieties, employing a
Cobb-Douglas production function Yt+1 = exp
( ∫ 1
0 log(yjt+1)dj
)
. Given this final good production,
the optimal demand for each intermediate variety j is yjt+1 =
Yt+1
pjt+1
.
The timeline is as follows. Workers supply labor inelastically for a wage during their youth
in t and consume during their old age in t + 1. In the first period, intermediate firms make two
decisions: first, they choose their optimal innovation efforts; next, once the innovation process is
realized, they decide whether to produce in the second period. To produce, firms need to invest in
physical capital in t. Banks collect savings from households to lend to firms.7 Active firms produce.
Timing
t
Young workers supply labor (innovation & production)
New firms innovate:
-if successful, invest in capital
-otherwise, exit
→ Old workers consume.
→ Active firms produce.
Old workers consume.
Active firms produce.
−→
−→
Young workers supply labor (...)
New firms innovate (...)
t+ 1
economies, as reported by Gorodnichenko and Schnitzer (2013). Finally, note that a home firm would not invest
simply to catch-up to its rival’s technology, as it would earn zero profits (see also Grossman and Helpman 1991).
6I assume that the probability of two firms innovating at the same time is zero, to be consistent with standard
models of innovation (Grossman and Helpman 1991; Aghion and Howitt 2009; among others).
7For simplicity, I let firms borrow from banks once they learn about the result of the innovation process and,
hence, there is no uncertainty in the debt contract. As standard in innovation models, this assumption implies that
workers are able to insure against the innovation risk (see Acemoglu 2009; Aghion and Howitt 1992; Peters 2013).
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ii) Banking Sector and Capital Controls
Consider a perfectly competitive banking sector in which risk-neutral banks act as intermediaries
that collect savings from young workers to lend to local firms. Banks face an intermediation cost µ
per unit of amount lent that depends on the level of financial development in the country, µ > 0.
In equilibrium, the domestic lending (RLt+1) and deposit (R
D
t+1) interest rates satisfy
RLt+1 = R
D
t+1 + µ. (1)
Capital controls on domestic agents allow only local banks to intermediate foreign funds, but
they incur a cost. In particular, banks need to pay a tax τ˜ per unit of foreign borrowing or lending,
which is then redistributed lump-sum to local households. Importantly, this tax level determines
whether banks have incentives to intermediate foreign funds and, accordingly, whether the economy
is open or closed to international financial flows.
To determine the direction of capital flows upon the liberalization is necessary to solve for the
equilibrium interest rate in the closed economy. Accordingly, I start by presenting an economy
in which the tax rate on foreign transactions is high enough such that banks do not intermediate
foreign funds and international financial flows are shut down (Sections 2.2 and 2.3). Next, I turn
to study the effects of a reduction in capital controls (Section 2.4). I normalize the intermediation
cost of the world to zero and denote the foreign interest rate as R∗t+1. Focusing on a capital-scarce
economy, I let the domestic lending rate –to be determined below– be higher than the foreign rate:
RLt+1 > R
∗
t+1.
2.2 Firms’ Optimal Behavior and Aggregate Productivity Growth
Firms’ optimal strategies are solved by backward induction. I focus on the main results and present
the derivations in Appendix B.
-Production and Price Setting. In this Bertrand setting, only the firm with the lowest marginal
cost in each variety is active in equilibrium. The marginal cost of the active firm in variety j
is MCsjt+1 =
1
qsjt+1
(
Rs
′
t+1
α )
α(wt+11−α )
1−α, where Rs
′
is either the local lending rate for home firms
(RL) or the world rate (R∗) for foreign firms. Higher financing terms imply higher marginal costs.
After minimizing its production costs and setting its price, the active firm’s profit from production
activities is Πpsjt+1 = (1 − ξ
−1
sjt+1)Yt+1, where ξsjt+1 denotes its markup. This expression shows
that a firm’s profit is proportional to its markup, which is the only firm-specific variable in the
expression. In equilibrium, the active firm’s markup is equal to the intermediate good’s price over
the marginal cost, where the price is set to the marginal cost of the firm’s closest competitor, and
its marginal cost depends on the result of the innovation process and financing costs. I present
separately the cases in which either the foreign or the home firm is active in equilibrium.
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If the foreign firm in variety j is active, its markup will be either
ξpostFjt+1 ≡
pjt+1
MCpostFjt+1
= τt+1 λ
∆j+1 or ξpreFjt+1 ≡
pjt+1
MCpreFjt+1
= τt+1 λ
∆j , (2)
where post and pre denote whether it succeeds in improving its technology or maintains its initial
productivity level. Equation (2) shows that the foreign firm’s markup has two components. First,
as in quality ladder models, the leader’s markup increases with the technology gap between the
leader and its closest market rival (∆j) because the productivity advantage allows setting higher
prices. Second, the new feature of the model is that the foreign firm’s markup is distorted by τt+1,
where τt+1 ≡ (R
L
t+1/R
∗
t+1)
α > 1 and represents the difference in borrowing costs between home
and foreign firms. Therefore, besides any technological advantage that foreign firms might enjoy,
they can obtain higher markups stemming from their preferential access to capital markets. That
is, a higher local lending rate implies high marginal costs for home firms, which undermines their
competitive pressure and allows foreign firms to set higher prices.
If instead the home firm in variety j is active, its markup will be
ξpostHjt+1 ≡
pjt+1
MCpostHjt+1
=
1
τt+1
λ. (3)
Similar to foreign firms’ markups, equation (3) shows that the home firm’s markup depends on
the technology advantage and the asymmetric access to international capital markets. However,
unlike the foreign firm, the home firm’s markup is reduced by the differential access to finance,
τt+1. The reason is that, even if the home firm manages to obtain a frontier technology and the
lowest marginal cost, it still faces higher borrowing costs than its foreign rival. If the home firm
does not succeed in obtaining a frontier technology, it will continue to have a higher marginal cost
than its foreign rival and will remain out of the market. I now turn to study how this distortion in
firms’ profits affects their incentives to invest in technology.
-Innovation Activities. In the first period, firms choose their optimal innovation efforts so as to
maximize their expected profits net of the innovation costs. After maximizing their total profits,
their optimal innovation intensities, xFt and xHt, become
xFt =
φ
τt+1
(1− λ−1)
wt
Yt+1
R∗t+1
and xHt =
φ
τ
1/α
t+1
(1− τt+1 λ
−1)
wt
Yt+1
R∗t+1
. (4)
As in quality ladder models, firms’ optimal innovation efforts depend on the market size (Y), the
efficiency of the innovation technology (φ), the increment in technology (λ), and the innovation
cost in labor units (w). The new feature of the model is that all firms’ optimal innovation efforts
also depend on the distortion in the access to international capital markets. Critically, home and
foreign firms’ efforts are reduced by τt+1. Two forces lead to this result. Regarding home firms, their
higher borrowing costs reduce their post-innovation profits and, hence, their innovation incentives.
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Concerning foreign firms, their innovation efforts are reduced because –when they are the market
leaders– they face weak competition and enjoy greater monopolistic power to set prices. Higher
prices lower their production levels and, hence, their innovation incentives aiming to reduce the
production costs. In this way, differences in borrowing costs affect all firms’ markups and, hence,
their profits and optimal innovation efforts.
-Aggregate Productivity Growth. In each intermediate variety, the expected productivity increase
is given by log(λ)(xHt + xFt), as each innovation raises productivity by a factor of log(λ), and
domestic and foreign firms innovate with a probability xHt and xFt. Under the law of large numbers,
a continuum of varieties ensures that aggregate productivity growth is given by
gQt+1 = log (λ) (xFt + xHt). (5)
Equation (5) shows that distortions in the access to international capital markets significantly re-
duce aggregate productivity growth, as they decrease home and foreign firms’ innovation efforts.
2.3 Equilibrium
An equilibrium is represented by the sequence {xst, psjt+1, ysjt+1, wt+1, R
L
t+1}
∞
t=0 such that: banks
have zero profits and equation (1) is satisfied; active firms in each variety set the price equal to
the marginal cost of the closest competitor, and the intermediate optimal demand for each variety
(yjt+1) is satisfied; firms’ innovation intensities are given by equation (4), such that xHt and xFt
maximize expected profits taking aggregate output, wages, interest rates, and the innovation efforts
of other firms as given; the economy growth rate is gY t+1 =
1
1−αgQt+1, where gQt+1 is given by (5);
labor and capital markets clear; aggregate consumption is the sum of old workers’ consumption, and
aggregate output is given by Yt+1.
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Labor market clearing implies that all workers are employed in either production (LP ) or inno-
vation activities (LI), i.e. Lt+1 ≡ 1 = L
I
t+1+L
p
t+1. In this closed economy, capital market clearing
implies that home firms’ investment equals the local savings of young workers, and the domestic
lending and deposit interest rates are given by
RDt+1 = R
L
t+1 − µ = α
Yt+1
KHt+1
ΛHt+1 − µ, (6)
where KHt+1 and Λ
H
t+1 are the aggregate capital demand and markups of active home firms. Equa-
tion (6) shows that the domestic deposit rate depends on two components: the domestic capital
stock and the local level of financial development. Importantly, they operate in opposite directions.
First, as in a standard small economy model, the more capital scarce is the economy, the higher
8See Appendix B.1 for derivations.
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is the lending rate and, hence, the deposit interest rate. Second, the lower is the level of financial
development (higher µ), the lower is the deposit rate. Hence, the equilibrium level of the deposit
interest rate in the closed economy depends on which of the two components prevails. The econ-
omy’s budget constraint is given by Ct+1 + I
H
t+1 = wt+1L
p
t+1 + R
D
t+1K
H
t+1 + Π
H
t+1, where domestic
consumption and home investment equal the wages in production activities, payments to home
capital, and net profits of active domestic firms. Note that foreign firms invest capital until their
return is equal to the world interest rate. The balance of payment implies that the current and
capital account sum to zero and that foreign firms’ net profits and capital repayment equal their
investment: −[ΠFt+1 +R
∗
t+1K
F
t+1] + I
F
t+1 = 0.
2.4 Financial Liberalization
I turn to study how a reduction in capital controls affects capital flows, competition, and in-
vestment in technology. I first introduce how these controls affect banks’ optimal behavior and,
through them, the direction of capital flows upon the financial liberalization (Section 2.4.1). Next,
I present the case in which financial liberalization leads to capital inflows and derive the qualita-
tive implications of a reduction in capital controls that guide the empirical analysis (Section 2.4.2).9
2.4.1 Banks and the Direction of Capital Flows
Under capital controls, banks have two financing choices: they can either use local savings and
pay the deposit rate RDt+1 or borrow foreign savings and pay the world rate plus the per unit
tax R∗t+1 + τ˜ . Similarly, banks have two lending options: they can either lend to home firms for
a net return of RLt+1 − µ or pay the tax and lend internationally for a return R
∗
t+1 − τ˜ . I have
assumed earlier that τ˜ was prohibitively high such that banks did not intermediate foreign funds
(i.e. RDt+1 < R
∗
t+1+ τ˜ , and R
L
t+1−µ > R
∗
t+1− τ˜). I present below how a reduction in capital controls
affects banks’ financing and lending activities and, hence, the direction of capital flows upon the
liberalization.
Financial liberalization implies a reduction in the tax on foreign transactions to τˆ . In this
capital-scarce economy, the direction of capital flows upon the liberalization depends on the coun-
try’s level of financial development. This economy faces two different cases. First, if the local level
of financial development is sufficiently high (low µ), the closed-economy domestic deposit rate is
greater than the foreign rate plus the new tax on foreign transactions (RDt+1 > R
∗
t+1+ τˆ), and banks
find it less costly to finance themselves using foreign funds. Furthermore, since the return from
lending abroad is lower than the net local lending rate, banks only lend locally.10 This is the case
9Section B.5 develops the case in which financial liberalization leads to capital outflows.
10To see this, consider that RDt+1 > R
∗
t+1 + τˆ implies that R
L
t+1 − µ > R
∗
t+1 + τˆ , which is greater than R
∗
t+1 − τˆ ,
i.e. the net interest rate that banks would obtain from lending abroad. Banks’ optimal choices are derived formally
in Appendix B.2.
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in which the economy receives capital inflows. Second, if instead the level of financial development
is low (high µ), the net interest rate that banks would receive from lending locally is lower than the
net return from lending abroad (RLt+1 − µ < R
∗
t+1 − τˆ), and banks prefer to lend to foreign agents.
Additionally, banks finance themselves by employing local savings only because the local deposit
rate is lower than the cost of employing foreign savings.11 This is the case in which the economy
sees capital outflows. The next section discusses the implications of a reduction in capital controls
leading to capital inflows on market competition and investment in technology for an economy
subject to capital controls with τˆ .
2.4.2 Qualitative Predictions
Capital inflows reduce the domestic deposit rate until it is equal to the foreign interest rate plus
the new tax level (τˆ), and banks become indifferent between using local or foreign savings. In the
new equilibrium, the domestic deposit and lending rates, RˆDt+1 and Rˆ
L
t+1, are given by
RˆDt+1 = R
∗
t+1 + τˆ and Rˆ
L
t+1 = R
∗
t+1 + τˆ + µ.
The domestic deposit and lending rates become exogenously determined and lower than in the
closed economy. Crucially, this decrease in the local lending rate reduces the asymmetric access to
external finance between foreign and home firms.12
To analyze the effects of financial liberalization on competition and productivity, I conduct
comparative statics exercises with respect to τ and derive five qualitative implications of the ef-
fect of a reduction in capital controls. These propositions, discussed formally in Appendix B.3,
are derived analytically in a partial equilibrium setting where aggregate output and wages are held
constant, and are confirmed in general equilibrium using a numerical illustration in Appendix B.4.13
-Proposition 1: Innovation intensities. A reduction in the asymmetric access to international
borrowing (τ) encourages home and foreign firms to increase their innovation intensities (xHt and
xFt). Notably, the innovation efforts of home firms increase relatively more:
∂xFt
∂τt+1
< 0,
∂xHt
∂τt+1
< 0 and |
∂xFt
∂τt+1
| < |
∂xHt
∂τt+1
|.
Proposition 1 states that financial liberalization leading to capital inflows encourages home and
11Note that as RDt+1 < R
∗
t+1 − τˆ , R
D
t+1 < R
∗
t+1 + τˆ , implying that the local deposit rate is lower than the cost of
raising foreign funds.
12Note that, given a change in capital controls, the lower is the level of financial development, the lower is the
decrease in the domestic lending interest rate and the increase in capital inflows. This is in line with cross-country
studies showing that the impact of financial liberalization is larger in countries with a higher level of financial
development, as in Bekaert, Harvey, and Lundblad (2011); and Kose, Prasad, Rogoff, and Wei (2008).
13In these propositions, I assume an additional technical restriction on λ < 2. This parameter relates to the fre-
quency of the innovations and is usually parametrized between 1.05 and 1.25 (see Stokey 1995; Bloom, Schankerman,
and Van Reenen 2013; and Acemoglu and Akcigit 2011, among others).
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foreign firms to increase their innovation efforts. Home firms invest more in technology because the
liberalization reduces their financing costs, increasing their post-innovation profits. Foreign firms
invest more in technology because the benefit from innovating increases. That is, the liberalization
narrows the gap between firms’ marginal costs, deepening competition and inducing foreign firms
to increase innovation efforts to escape competition.14 Importantly, the innovation efforts increase
more for home firms. As foreign firms are more productive than home firms, then –in the average
intermediate variety– the former are the incumbents and the latter are the entrants. Since the
distortion has a greater effect on the innovation incentives of the entrant-home firms relative to
that which undermines the foreign market leader (Arrow’s replacement effect), the liberalization
has a relative greater impact on the home firms’ innovation efforts.
-Proposition 2: Leverage. A reduction in τ raises home firms’ expected debt-to-sales ratio ((d/y)eHjt+1):
∂(d/y)eHjt+1
∂τt+1
< 0.
Financial liberalization lowers home firms’ financing costs, encouraging their investment and
leverage.
-Proposition 3: Markups. A decrease in τ reduces foreign firms’ expected markups (ξeFjt+1):
∂ξeFjt+1
∂τt+1
> 0.
Foreign firms’ markups originate from two sources: the difference in the borrowing costs and
the technological gap between the foreign firms and their local competitors. Both of these drop
following the reduction in capital controls. First, the improvement in financing terms deepens the
competitive pressure of home firms, undermining foreign firms’ ability to set higher prices and
obtain higher markups. Second, the greater innovation efforts of home firms reduce the technology
gap between the home firms and their foreign rivals.
-Proposition 4: Productivity gap. Reductions in the asymmetric access to capital markets (τ) de-
crease the expected productivity gap between home and foreign firms (∆et+1). In particular, this drop
is greater in varieties where foreign firms were technologically far ahead of their local competitors:
∂∆et+1
∂τt+1
> 0 and
∂∆et+1
∂τt+1∂∆t+1
> 0.
As home firms’ innovation efforts increase relatively more, they are more likely to overtake their
14Leader firms’ innovation efforts depend on the difference between the post- and pre-innovation profits, and both
of them decrease with the fall in capital controls. Importantly, pre-innovation profits decrease more, which raises the
benefit from innovating. The reason is that capital market distortions affect foreign firms’ profits more, the narrower
is the technology gap between the foreign firms and their home competitors.
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foreign rivals and decrease the technology gap between them. In addition, as home firms are more
likely to entry, the productivity gap narrows more in varieties where the initial gap was the largest.
-Proposition 5: Aggregate productivity growth. A decrease in τ increases aggregate productivity
growth (gQt+1):
∂gQt+1
∂τt+1
< 0.
As firms increase their innovation efforts, aggregate productivity growth increases. Notably,
this expansion stems from the two channels proposed in the paper: better financing terms induce
home firms to innovate more, and deeper competition encourages foreign firms to do the same.15
Propositions 1-5 provide qualitative implications about the impact of financial liberalization on
competition and firms’ investment in technology. In the next sections, I use the deregulation of
international financial flows in Hungary in 2001 to test these implications.
3 The Deregulation of International Financial Flows in Hun-
gary
This section presents the capital controls that were in place in Hungary prior to 2001 and describes
the liberalization of international financial flows and its impact on firms’ access to external funds.16
Prior to 2001, regulations in the foreign exchange (FX) market were the main capital control tool
in Hungary.17 Foreign exchange operations were regulated by Act XCV of 1995, which employed
three main tools to limit international financial flows. It used two tools to restrict banks’ ability to
intermediate foreign funds and one tool to prevent firms from borrowing internationally. The first
tool restricting banks’ international financial flows was the ban on currency forward instruments
–chiefly among them, FX swaps and forward contracts. These instruments allow hedging against
exchange rate fluctuations and, hence, are crucial for banks to raise foreign funds. The second tool
was the regulations on the spot market, which required banks’ transactions in foreign currency to
15As discussed above, if the local level of financial development is low, RLt+1 − µ < R
∗
t+1 − τˆ , and banks prefer to
lend to foreign agents. In this case, the model’s predictions are reversed and a reduction in capital controls leads to
capital outflows as well as lower competition and productivity growth (Appendix B.5).
16This reform was driven by the accession to the European Union. To join the EU, all candidate countries have to
accomplish the Copenhagen Criteria of 1993. One of these criteria is that candidates have to ensure free movement of
capital, the only missing requirement in Hungary. The reform completed the deregulation of international financial
flows. Section 5.1 discusses the identification strategy in detail.
17FX market controls are commonly used to regulate international capital flows, as they restrict agents from
acquiring foreign currency, hedging the exchange rate risk and, hence, borrowing or lending internationally. These
controls were widely implemented during the Bretton Woods years, when countries had fixed exchange rate regimes
(see Smith, Walter, and DeLong 2012). Lately, during the Great Recession, many emerging markets –as, for example,
Korea and Brazil– employed them to restrict capital inflows.
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be pre-approved by the Central Bank (National Bank of Hungary, NBH) and made the spot FX
market very illiquid.18 These restrictions substantially limited banks’ ability to intermediate foreign
funds and made them reluctant to borrow internationally. As a result, banks based their credit
supply on domestic savings, which led to a low level of credit. In 2000, Hungary’s credit-to-GDP
ratio (0.27) was three times smaller than the OECD average (0.86), and its credit-to-deposit ratio
was a third lower (0.83 versus 1.2 in OECD countries).
The third tool that Act XCV used to limit international financial flows was the regulation on
firms’ borrowing in foreign currency. Under this law, only firms declaring to tax authorities that
they receive foreign currency income were allowed to borrow in foreign currency.19 Crucially, this
regulation divided firms into two groups. The first group of firms, domestic firms, were limited to
borrowing locally in national currency and, hence, were disproportionally affected by the low level
of credit in the local financial system. The second group of firms was composed of foreign companies
that, unlike domestic firms, could avoid the local restrictions by directly obtaining international
funds.20 Although there is no precise record indicating the exact amount of foreign indebtedness
at the firm level, there is substantial evidence that foreign firms used these funds intensively. As
reported by the IMF (1998), these firms employed two main sources of international funds. First,
they enjoyed the relationship between the parent company and its banks to access foreign bank
credit. Second, they intensively used internal capital markets with their parent companies. In
1998, more than one-third (35%) of total credit in the economy was internal credit between parent
companies and subsidiaries in Hungary. This use of internal capital markets offers foreign firms
financial advantages relative to their local competitors, as shown by Desai, Foley, and Hines (2004);
and Desai, Foley, and Forbes (2008), among others.
In this way, FX controls created asymmetric access to international borrowing between domestic
and foreign firms. This asymmetry was reflected in differences in firms’ financing terms, as implied
in the model. The BEEPS indicate that domestic firms paid interest rates that were 3.2 percentage
points higher than foreign firms and that the required value of the collateral on total debt was 58%
greater (Table 1). As a result, domestic firms’ leverage was a third lower than that foreign firms.
In my empirical analysis, I exploit this pre-reform asymmetry to identify the effect of the financial
18In particular, the regulations in the spot market included a ban on foreign financial investors to participate in
the market, restrictions in the amount of interbank lending in foreign currency, and the requirement for banks to
apply for individual licenses to acquire foreign currency.
19In particular, the Act regulated which firms could have bank accounts in foreign currency. Under this law, only
firms reporting to tax authorities that they receive foreign currency income were allowed to apply for convertible
accounts, i.e. bank accounts denominated in foreign currency. Without declaring foreign currency income, firms were
not allowed to open convertible accounts and, thus, could not borrow in foreign currency.
20While the law allowed domestic exporters to borrow internationally, the empirical evidence suggests that they
were not obtaining international funds. As discussed in Section 5.2, prior to the reform, domestic exporters had the
same level of leverage and financing terms as domestic non-exporters and shared the same post-reform pattern of
growth (see Tables A.4 and A.5 in the online Appendix). Notably, even after the financial liberalization, domestic
exporters had limited access to international capital markets. In 2004, only fourteen domestic exporters reported
that they had debt in foreign markets. In this way, the empirical evidence suggests that Hungarian exporters and
non-exporters were similarly constrained from borrowing from abroad. For this reason, I treat these firms similarly
and focus on a much sharper contrast revealed in the data: the asymmetric access to international borrowing between
foreign and domestic firms.
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liberalization within Hungary.
In 2001, Act XCIII removed the regulations in the FX market, namely the ban on forward
currency instruments and the restrictions on the spot market and on firms’ foreign currency bor-
rowing. The liberalization had a large impact on banks’ use of foreign funds. As shown in Figure
1, within the three years before and after the reform (1998-2004), net capital inflows of financial
institutions rose from 0.6 to 3.3 billion U.S. dollars per year, and their external debt more than
tripled, reaching 20 billion U.S. dollars. In parallel, banks started intensively employing financial
derivatives, particularly FX swaps. Both cross-border and local derivatives soared and, by 2004,
they had increased by more than three-fold. The increase in banks’ liquidity was associated with
an expansion in the local credit supply. Table 1 shows that, by 2004, the credit-to-GDP ratio had
almost doubled and the credit-to-deposit ratio had grown by more than a third.
Capital inflows led to a decrease in the lending interest rate, which substantially improved
financing terms for domestic firms and –as in the model– reduced the asymmetric access to finance
across firms. By 2004, the interest rate differential between domestic and foreign firms had fallen
five-fold from 3.2 percentage points to 0.65 percentage point, and the difference in the value of
the required collateral had dropped four-fold from 58 to 11 percentage points. In addition, data
from the NBH reveal that small and medium enterprises increased their share of total credits by
17 percentage points. Importantly, this expansion was driven by credits in FX: by 2004, one-third
of their credit was denominated in foreign currency. In the aggregate, the expansion of banks’
international borrowing was also reflected in the financial account, whose deficit almost doubled by
2004 (from 3.8 to 6.9 billion of U.S. dollars per year).
The figures above indicate that the financial liberalization in Hungary was associated with cap-
ital inflows and with a reduction in the asymmetric access to finance between domestic and foreign
firms, as the model illustrates. In the next sections, I employ the model’s qualitative implications
to assess whether this reduction affects competition and productivity growth.
4 Data
I test the model’s predictions using two firm-level databases: APEH, which contains panel data on
firms’ balance sheets reported to tax authorities and is provided by the Statistical Department of
the National Bank of Hungary, and the Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Surveys
(BEEPS) of the World Bank and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development.
The APEH database contains census data on manufacturing firms and spans the period 1992-
2008. This database provides information on firms’ value added, sales, output, stock of capital,
employment, wages, materials, exports, and ownership structure, which I employ to construct
measures of capital intensity (capital per worker), labor productivity (value added per worker),
RTFP, markup, and ownership status. To obtain real values, I use price indexes at four-digit
NACE industries for materials, investment, value added, and production. The RTFP measure is
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computed using the Olley and Pakes (1996) method to estimate the parameters of the production
function. For robustness, I additionally estimate these parameters using De Loecker and Warzynski
(2012), Petrin and Levinsohn (2012), and Wooldridge (2009) methodologies. I estimate markups
as a wedge between the firm’s labor share and the labor elasticity of production. Following the
standard literature, I define a firm as foreign if more than 10% of its shares belong to foreign
owners. Beginning in 1999, firms were asked to report short-term debt undertaken with financial
institutions. I use this information to construct a proxy for leverage: the short-term debt-to-sales
ratio. Since providing this information is optional, only some firms provided it, shrinking the sample
of non-missing observations by approximately 50%.
The firm-level analysis in Sections 5.2-5.4 focuses on a balanced panel of 5,548 firms present over
the period 1998-2004 and for which there is enough information to compute the RTFP measure.
Since smaller firms are more subject to measurement error problems, I retain firms with five or more
employees. This balanced panel accounts for 77% of value added and 70% of employment in the
manufacturing sector. Additionally, I employ the unbalanced panel to conduct several robustness
tests and conduct the industry- and aggregate-level analysis in Sections 5.5 and 5.6.
I assess changes in firms’ innovation activities using the BEEPS (2002 and 2005). These surveys
provide information on all economic activities and employ stratified random sampling to ensure that
they are representative of the population of firms. The BEEPS report information on innovation
activities and expenditures in R&D. The surveys ask whether the firm has conducted any of the
following activities in the previous three years: developed a major product line, upgraded an
existing product line, acquired a new production technology, obtained a new licensing agreement,
or obtained a new quality accreditation.21 I construct a dummy variable (Innovation) if the firm has
undertaken any of these activities and a dummy variable (R&D) if the firm reports R&D spending.
The surveys also report information on firms’ financing terms –cost of loans and the value of the
collateral required on total loans– which I employ in Section 5.3.
To test the financial channel, I use information on sector dependence on external finance from
Raddatz (2006), who re-estimated the financial dependence index of Rajan and Zingales (1998) for
U.S. listed firms at the four-digit industry level. This index measures the amount of investment
that cannot be financed through internal cash flows and is used as a proxy for sectors’ technological
needs for external finance. As capital markets are largely advanced in the United States and listed
firms are less likely to be credit constrained, this index tends to capture the technical needs for ex-
ternal finance in the sector. Using an index estimated for U.S. firms avoids endogeneity concerns.22
21These measures of innovation follow the recommendations of the Oslo Manual developed by the OECD and
Eurostat for innovation surveys. This definition of innovation focuses on new and improved product and processes
that are "new to the firm". This emphasis on "what is new to the firm" is of special interest to this study because
Hungary is a developing economy, and the easing of credit conditions might have encouraged more domestic firms to
adopt frontier technologies rather than develop new ones. Importantly, the majority of firms (75%) have reported
that these activities were a critical contributor to their growth. See also Gorodnichenko and Schnitzer (2013).
22More precisely, Rajan and Zingales (1998) define needs for external finance as firms’ capital expenditures minus
cash flows from operations divided by capital expenditures for U.S. listed firms. Then they use the sector median
value to construct the dependence on external finance for each industry at the three-digit level.
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5 Empirics
This section assesses the impact of the financial liberalization in Hungary on market competition
and firms’ investment in technology. I employ the model’s qualitative implications to guide the
empirical analysis. In Section 5.1, I start by describing the identification strategy. In Sections 5.2
and 5.3, I test whether domestic firms expanded more than foreign firms in terms of investment
in technology (Proposition 1) and whether this expansion correlates with an increase in leverage
(Proposition 2). In Sections 5.4 and 5.5, I evaluate whether deeper competition leads to reduc-
tions in foreign firms’ markups (Proposition 3) and changes in the productivity gap within sectors
(Proposition 4). In Section 5.6, I assess whether aggregate productivity growth accelerates (Propo-
sition 5) and explore the source of this growth.
5.1 Identification Strategy
This section presents the identification strategy and discusses possible concerns regarding the em-
pirical analysis, for example, differences in firms’ initial characteristics and previous growth trends,
differences in industrial patterns of growth, sample selection, and reverse causality.
The identification strategy of the effect of financial liberalization is based on the asymmetric
access to international capital markets for domestic and foreign firms prior to the reform. I exploit
this source of cross-sectional variation to test the two forces proposed in this paper. I test the first
force –financial liberalization encouraging home firms’ investment in technology– in two steps. I
first estimate the differential impact of the reform on domestic firms’ investment. I next examine
the financial channel by adding another source of cross-sectional variation: sector financial needs.
That is, I exploit three sources of variation –time, sector reliance on external finance, and firms’
access to international borrowing prior the reform– to assess whether home firms with greater
needs for external finance expand more after the liberalization. I complement this analysis by
using direct information on firms’ leverage and financing terms to test whether home firms increase
the use of bank credit. To test the second force –financial liberalization deepening competition– I
exploit variations in terms of sector financial needs. Since the asymmetric access to international
borrowing has a more distortionary effect on competition in sectors in which domestic firms employ
external finance more intensively, the deepening of market competition is relatively greater in those
sectors. Hence, I exploit differences in sector financial needs to identify the pro-competitive forces
on foreign firms across sectors.
To identify the effect of the reform, it is important to determine whether domestic and foreign
firms differed in characteristics that could involve heterogeneous patterns of investment and pro-
ductivity growth. If these differences were not accounted for, the estimated coefficients could be
biased. Table 2 breaks down the data into domestic and foreign firms and presents sample means
in the initial year (1998) by type of firm. Prior to the reform, foreign firms were older; were larger
in terms of value added, employment, labor productivity, and RTFP; and enjoyed higher markups.
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These firms also had a higher probability of conducting innovation and R&D activities, as shown
in Table 3. Since the difference in means in these variables is statistically significant, I control for
them in my reduced-form regressions.
A main assumption of the empirical strategy is that before the reform, firms shared similar
growth trends. Indeed, a first glance at the data confirms that domestic and foreign firms saw
similar patterns of growth within the five years preceding the reform (1996-2000). Figure 2 plots
the evolution of the main outcomes analyzed: labor productivity, RTFP, capital intensity, markups,
and leverage. Values are normalized to their initial levels. Remarkably, these parallel patterns of
growth reversed after the reform. In line with the theory proposed in this paper, following the
liberalization, the average domestic firm grew faster in terms of labor productivity, RTFP, capital
intensity, and leverage. Also, consistent with the model’s predictions, foreign firms’ markups shrank
faster. The analysis of the sample means confirms that the growth rates of foreign and home firms
were not statistically different over the five years before the deregulation (Table 4).
The previous paragraph discussed the concern over firms’ pre-existing growth trends. If domestic
firms were correlated with some industry characteristics, however, it would be necessary to control
for them to rule out possible sources of bias. I estimate the equations in first differences, so
that time-invariant industry characteristics are differenced out. However, if sectors with different
initial characteristics were on different trends, the estimated coefficient could capture some omitted
industry-level time-dependent variable. I tackle this issue in three different ways. First, to account
for sectoral pre-existing growth trends, I include the capital intensity and productivity growth at the
four-digit NACE industry level in Hungary before the reform (1996-1997). Second, since sectors’
investment and productivity could be growing at a different pace in the global economy, I also
control for capital intensity and productivity growth in the United States. Third, as a robustness
test, I also consider sector and sector-year fixed effects at the four-digit NACE industry level.
A critical hypothesis underlying the study is that the sample is not subject to selection issues;
that is, pro-competitive forces may affect not only firms’ outcomes but also the probability of a
firm being observed. If this probability differed between domestic and foreign firms over time,
the conditional expectations on the OLS residuals would be different from zero and the estimated
coefficients would be biased (see Heckman 1974 and Heckman 1979). To assess whether this missing
data problem challenges my estimations, I check whether there are differences in the probability of
domestic and foreign firms being observed. In particular, I define a surviving firm if it existed the
year before the reform (2000) and did not exit within the three years following it. Next, I compute
the survival ratio of domestic and foreign firms and test whether there are differences in their means.
Results show no statistically significant difference between the survival probability of domestic and
foreign firms, and suggest that this missing data problem does not affect the estimated coefficients
(Table A.1 in the online Appendix).
The general context around the reform and its timing makes it likely to be exogenous with
respect to the main outcome analyzed, i.e. changes in home firms’ investment in technology. The
reform was driven by the accession of transition economies to the EU. The requirements to join the
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EU were predetermined by the Copenhagen Criteria in 1993 and have been equal for all accessing
countries since then. In this sense, the content of the reform was exogenous to the country’s
political choice. As the agenda was jointly determined by the European Council and the candidate
countries, it is unlikely to have been driven by political pressure from Hungarian firms.23
Even though the preceding points address the reverse causality problem, any event occurring
in the years around the reform and affecting firms’ investment choices differentially could affect
the estimated coefficients. To identify the effect of the reform, I restrict the analysis to the three
years preceding and following it. Importantly, during this period, no other significant event that
could differentially affect firms’ investment in technology occurred in Hungary. First, the economy
was growing at a steady pace, with no significant shock in these years. Notably, real external flows
–as trade and foreign direct investment– remained constant.24 Second, major reforms had already
taken place during the early 1990s, such as privatization of public companies, bank deregulation,
and competition laws.25 Third, the EU did not require any further reform that could affect the
development of the manufacturing sector. Finally, the Hungarian economy was already deeply in-
tegrated with the EU. This integration was remarkable in the manufacturing sector: this sector’s
exports to the EU already accounted for 80% of total exports in 2001 (Figure A.2). It is worth
mentioning that the patterns of capital inflows observed in Hungary cannot be attributed to the
joining of the EU, as the timing does not coincide with the accession, and other similar candidates
with already deregulated financial accounts do not show the pattern of capital inflows observed in
Hungary (Figure A.3). Notice that Hungary did not join the Euro zone and, hence, did not have
to fulfill any monetary or fiscal criteria.
5.2 Impact on Home Firms’ Investment
As discussed above, the deregulation of international financial flows in Hungary led to capital in-
flows and to a reduction in the asymmetric access to external finance between domestic and foreign
firms. Proposition 1 states that this reduction encourages home firms to increase their investment
in technology. In this section, I assess this prediction in two steps. I first study whether domestic
23It is worth mentioning that, given the speed of the reform, it is unlikely that firms anticipated it and undertook
investment in advance. In December 2000, the European Council defined the timing for the accession vote and the
last requirements to be met by each candidate. The reform had to take place before the accession vote in December
2002. Soon after the European Council meeting, in March 2001, Hungary deregulated the remaining controls on
financial flows.
24During the years preceding and following the reform, FDI remained constant and even showed a small slowdown
following the deregulation (see Figure A.4). Moreover, Hungarian external trade did not seem to have particularly
suffered from the world recession in 2001. The volume of exports and imports continued to grow during that period
(Figure A.5).
25Major privatization programs occurred in the early 1990s, and by 1997, the share of public companies in manu-
facturing value added was only 2%. The Competition Act entered into force in 1997, and according to the Hungarian
Competition Authority, the accession to the EU did not cause a major change in this field. The banking sector
had already achieved a major transformation by 1997, and neither banking concentration nor its efficiency changed
around the liberalization. In particular, according to data from Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and Levine (2010), there were
no changes in banks’ concentration index, interest rate margin, overhead costs-to-assets ratio, nor cost-income ratio
(Figure A.1). Furthermore, the number of credit institutions did not change (Table A.2).
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firms increase their capital intensity and productivity. Then I turn to test whether they expand
their R&D and innovation activities.
Investment in Capital and Productivity
I analyze the differential impact of the liberalization of international financial flows on domestic
firms’ capital and productivity considering the following model:
yit = δ0Hi + δ1Tt + δ2(Hi xTt) + εit, (7)
where i indexes firms, t denotes time, H is a dummy variable for domestic firms, T is dummy
variable for the post-reform period, and y is a vector of {capital intensity, labor productivity, and
RTFP}. The coefficient of interest is δ2 and captures the impact of the reform on domestic firms’
outcomes.
A potential pitfall of regression (7), estimated with yearly firm-level data, is that residuals could
be serially correlated –across time within firms and across firms within sectors for a given year.
Serial correlation in the error term might understate the OLS standard errors and induce a type II
error, i.e. rejecting the null hypothesis when this is true. To account for this source of bias in the
OLS standard errors, I use one of the solutions proposed by Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan
(2004) and remove the time series dimension of the data. More precisely, I aggregate the data into
pre- and post-reform periods, defined as the three years before and after the deregulation.26 The
dependent variable is computed as the average value between 1998 and 2000, and between 2002
and 2004:
∆ yi = log(
1
3
2004∑
2002
yit)− log(
1
3
2000∑
1998
yit).
Equation (7) in first differences becomes
∆yi = δ1 + δ2Hi +∆εi. (8)
I cluster the OLS standard errors at the four-digit NACE industry level to take into account the
correlation across firms within sectors. Regression (8), in first differences, removes firm- and sector-
fixed effects and therefore controls for time unvarying unobserved characteristics at the firm and
industry levels. However, the fixed effects do not absorb individual characteristics that could lead
firms to benefit differently from the introduction of the reform. When estimating equation (8), I
therefore add a set of initial conditions at the firm level, Zi, as size (employment), productivity
26Notice that, as the reform took place in the middle of 2001, this year is only a partially treated year and, hence,
does not belong to either of the two groups. As the purpose of the analysis is to estimate the average effect of the
policy, it would be misleading to include it in either of the groups. For this reason, I drop the year 2001 in the main
specifications. Importantly, I show below that all results are robust to its inclusion when estimating the effect of the
reform by year (Tables A.11, A.17, A.18, and Figure 3).
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(RTFP), and age at the initial year (1998). As sectors could be on different trends, I control for
pre-existing growth trends of RTFP and capital intensity at the four-digit NACE industry level
between 1996 and 1997 in Hungary, Xj . To account for differences in industry growth trends in the
world economy, I add the following as controls: capital intensity and TFP growth at the four-digit
level in the United States between 1998 and 2004, ψj . The statistical model I estimate is
∆yij = δ1 + δ2Hi + δ3Zi + δ4Xj + δ5∆ψj +∆εij . (9)
The estimation of equation (9) by OLS is reported in Table 5. The coefficient for capital intensity
estimated in the baseline specification of column 1, where only the dummy for the domestic firm is
included as a regressor, implies a differential expansion of these firms’ capital intensity by 0.239 log
point (t = 10.24). The estimated coefficient is not affected by the inclusion of firm-level controls
in column 2 nor by the inclusion of local and global trends in column 3, and remains stable across
estimations. Results for labor productivity are presented in columns 4-6. The baseline specification
in column 4 indicates a differential impact for domestic firms of 0.074 log point (t = 4.35). The
inclusion of firm and industry controls does not significantly affect the estimated coefficient, which
stands at 0.053 log point (t = 3.36). The estimates for RTFP confirm the greater expansion in
productivity for home firms. After controlling for firm and sector characteristics, the estimated
coefficient in column 9 shows a differential increase of 0.032 logs point (t = 2.03) for domestic
firms.
In the online Appendix, I present a full set of robustness tests. Table A.3 shows that results
are robust to control for four-digit industry fixed effects (column 1), wholly foreign companies
(column 2), foreign firms used as export platforms (column 3), 1% of top firms (column 4), and
firms that change their ownership status (column 5). The empirical evidence does not suggest
any significant difference between domestic exporters and non-exporters, as i) they faced similar
leverage and financing terms –interest rate and collateral– prior to the liberalization (Table A.4),
and ii) they showed non-statistically different patterns of growth in the post-reform period (Table
A.5). Additionally, I show that the RTFP results are robust to De Loecker and Warzynski (2012),
and Petrin and Levinsohn (2012) (with Wooldridge’s 2009 correction) measures (Table A.6). Im-
portantly, results are robust to controlling for firms’ subsidies and tax exemptions, for four-digit
industry-year fixed effects, and to considering the unbalanced panel and firms with fewer than five
employees (Tables A.7, A.8 and A.9). Home firms’ expansion is widespread across manufacturing
sectors (Table A.10).
Equation (9) pooled the estimated effect across all years before and after liberalization. To check
whether the estimates are capturing the effect of the financial liberalization and not something else,
I test whether the timing coincides with the deregulation. To this end, I interact the dummy for
home firms with year dummies and re-estimate equation (9) using four-digit NACE industry level
fixed effects. In this way, I compare domestic and foreign firms within each four-digit industry and
test whether domestic firms evolve differentially over time. Results are presented in Table A.11
and plotted in Figure 3. The estimated coefficients for the interaction terms are statistically sig-
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nificant, confirming that domestic firms were smaller in size (capital intensity, labor productivity,
and RTFP) than their foreign-industry competitors. Importantly, while the estimated coefficients
do not change significantly before the reform, they monotonically decrease after it. These results
suggest that home firms grew much faster and gradually closed the gap between the home firms and
their foreign rivals (Figure 3). The F-test on equality of coefficients confirms these results. While
the estimated coefficients for the interaction terms are not statistically different from 1998 to 2000,
they differ significantly when comparing the pre-reform and post-reform years (Table A.11). As a
further falsification test, I estimate a placebo test on the year 1998 and estimate equation (9) for
the period 1996-2000, with a two-year window. The results, presented in Table A.12, show that
during this period, domestic firms did not evolve differently from their foreign competitors.
R&D and Innovation Activities
To assess whether domestic firms increased their R&D and innovation activities after the liberal-
ization, I employ the BEEPS and estimate the following model:
yijt = δ0Hit + δ1Tt + δ2(Hit xTt) + δ3Zit + µj + εijt, (10)
where t denotes year; T is a dummy indicating the reform period; j represents sectors (which break
down into eight categories); yijt is a dummy for whether the firm conducts R&D or innovation
activities; and Zit is a vector of firm characteristics: age and size (employment).
27 To control
for sector-specific characteristics, I add sector fixed effects: µj . I cluster standard errors at the
sector level. Equation (10) with fixed effects cannot be consistently estimated by probit (incidental
parameters problem), so I estimate a linear probability model. The coefficient of interest is δ2,
which identifies the change in the probability of domestic firms undertaking R&D and innovation
activities after the reform.
Columns 1-3 in Table 6 report the results on R&D activities. The baseline specification suggests
that the reform increased the probability of domestic firms undertaking R&D activities by 10.7 per-
centage points (t = 2.24). The estimated coefficient remains stable and statistically significant after
the inclusion of firm- and industry-level controls (columns 2 and 3). Along the same lines, results
on innovation activities in columns 4-6 also suggest that the reform increased the probability of
domestic firms conducting these activities. The coefficient in the regression including all controls
(column 6) implies an increase of 12 percentage points (t = 2.19).
27As few firms report data on sales, controlling for firms’ productivity greatly reduces the sample. Importantly,
results are robust to this control.
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5.3 Investigating the Financial Channel
The previous section showed that domestic firms differentially expanded their capital intensity and
productivity after the reform. This section assesses in two steps whether this expansion correlates
with a greater use of external funds, as implied by the financial liberalization. I first evaluate
whether domestic firms grow more when they are more dependent on external finance and, hence,
more exposed to the reform. Next, I take Proposition 2 to the data and test whether –after control-
ling for firms’ observable characteristics– financial terms decrease for domestic firms and whether
they increase their leverage accordingly.
Investment in Capital and Productivity
I start assessing the financial channel by exploiting an additional source of cross-sectional variation:
sector needs for external finance. Importantly, this third source of variation allows for an assess-
ment of the two forces proposed in this paper: better financing terms encouraging domestic firms’
investment in technology and reductions in capital market distortions triggering pro-competitive
forces on foreign firms. Regarding the first force, sector financial needs allow for testing whether
domestic firms expand relatively more when they operate in sectors that rely intensively on external
finance. Concerning the second force, differences in sector financial needs allow for an assessment
of whether competition tightens more in sectors that are initially more distorted. Intuitively, since
the asymmetric access to international capital markets distorts competition more in sectors where
external funds are employed more intensively, competition should deepen relatively more in these
sectors. As such, foreign firms should also increase their productivity in accordance with sector
financial needs. Importantly, since the distortion has a greater effect on domestic firms’ innovation
incentives (Proposition 1), conditional on the sector, home firms should expand relatively more.
To evaluate these two channels, I include sector financial needs in equation (7) and consider the
following model:
yit = δ0Hi+δ1Tt+δ2(Hi xTt)+δ3(FDj xTt)+δ4(Hi xFDj xTt )+δ5FDj+δ6(Hi xFDj)+εit, (11)
where j denotes four-digit NACE industries and FDj is the index of external finance of Rajan and
Zingales (1998) at four-digit NACE industries.28 Coefficient δ3 captures the differential impact
of the reform on foreign firms across sectors. A positive and significant coefficient implies that
foreign firms expanded more in sectors where the need for external finance was greater. Coefficient
δ4 absorbs the differential impact of the reform on domestic firms across sectors. Importantly, it
reflects whether home firms expand relatively more than their foreign industry rivals with the same
level of reliance on external funds.
As discussed earlier, a potential pitfall of estimating equation (11) using yearly firm-level data is
that residuals could be serially correlated. To avoid serial correlation in the error term, I estimate
28See Ilyina and Samaniego (2011) for a further discussion about sectors’ technological needs for external finance.
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equation (11) in first differences. After the inclusion of firm-level and sector controls, the final
model I estimate is
∆yij = δ1 + δ2Hi + δ3 FDj + δ4 (Hi xFDj) + δ5Zi + δ6Xj + δ7∆ψj +∆εij . (12)
Similarly to equation (11), δ3 captures the effect of the reform on foreign firms across sectors.
The coefficient δ4 absorbs the differential effect of home firms over their foreign rivals in accordance
with sector financial needs. I control for firm-initial characteristics as well as sector pre-growth
trends in Hungary and global trends, and cluster the standard errors at four-digit NACE industries,
as in equation (9).
Columns 1-3 in Table 7 report the results on capital intensity. The coefficient on the interaction
term for home firms δ4 is statistically significant in all specifications. After including all controls
(column 3), the estimated coefficient implies that one standard deviation increase in the index of
external finance raises domestic firms’ capital intensity by 0.045 log point (t = 2.02). It is important
to remark on the estimated coefficient for foreign firms, δ3. This coefficient is not statistically
significant in any specification, showing that foreign firms did not expand their capital intensity
in accordance with sector financial needs. Notably, this lack of correlation between the need for
external finance and capital investment suggests that foreign firms were not credit constrained nor
in need of external funds before the liberalization.
Columns 4-6 present the results for labor productivity. The coefficient δ3 on the pro-competitive
forces on foreign firms across sectors shows that one standard deviation increase in the index of
financial dependence leads to an expansion of 0.09 log point (t = 2.50) in foreign firms’ labor
productivity after the inclusion of firm- and industry-level controls in column 6. As predicted by
the model, the expansion is higher for domestic firms: the coefficient δ4 implies an expansion of
0.04 log point (t = 3.17) relative to their foreign competitors in the same sector. Results on RTFP
confirm the pattern of growth in labor productivity (columns 7-9). After considering all controls,
the estimated coefficient indicates that one standard deviation increase in the index of financial
dependence raises foreign firms’ RTFP by 0.08 log point (t = 3.02) (column 9). As in the trends in
labor productivity, the estimated coefficient implies that domestic firms expanded relatively more:
their RTFP grew by 0.05 log point (t = 2.48) more than that of their foreign rivals.
These results provide support for the two forces proposed in this paper. First, consistent with
the greater exposure to the reform, domestic firms with higher sectoral needs for external funds
expanded their capital intensity and productivity relatively more. Second, in line with the presence
of pro-competitive forces, foreign firms increased their productivity in sectors where competition
was initially more distorted.29
The online Appendix presents four additional robustness tests. First, I re-estimate equation
(11) non-parametrically by splitting the sample into quartiles of dependence on external finance.
Results presented in Table A.13 confirm that home firms expanded monotonically with the level of
29This evidence is also consistent with previous industry-level studies reporting that increases in competition
induce incumbent firms to raise their productivity (see, for example, Holmes and Schmitz 2010).
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financial dependence and that the increase is significantly larger in the third and fourth quartiles.
Second, to test whether the response of foreign firms corresponds to tighter competition and not
to financial constraints on these firms, I estimate whether their responses vary when considering
different ownership structures. In particular, the presence of pro-competitive forces should remain
true even when considering foreign firms that are tightly linked to their parent companies and,
thus, are less likely credit constrained. To test this, I estimate regression (12) on foreign firms
with more than 50% foreign shares and show that the estimated coefficients on labor productivity
and RTFP remain positive and statistically significant even for this group of foreign firms (Table
A.14). Third, I show that the pro-competitive effects remain true after excluding foreign firms that
export more than 75% and 90% of their sales and, hence, operate as export platforms (Table A.15).
Finally, to check whether the increase in firms’ productivity is in line with a more intensive use
of technology, I construct a measure of skill intensity and test whether firms employ more skilled
labor after the liberalization.30 Results presented in Table A.16 confirm that foreign firms increase
their skill intensity in accordance with sector financial needs and, as in the previous trends, home
firms expand their skill intensity relatively more in these sectors.
Financing Terms and Leverage
Proposition 2 states that lowered financial costs following the liberalization allow domestic firms
to increase their leverage. I turn to assess this proposition by evaluating whether financing terms
improve for home firms and whether, as a result, they increase their leverage.
The BEEPS request firms to report the interest rate paid on loans and the value of the required
collateral. I use this information as outcome variables to regress equation (10) and report the
results in Table 8. Confirming that home firms faced tighter financing terms than foreign firms
prior to the reform, the estimated coefficients indicate that the interest rate that domestic firms
paid was 3.7 percentage points (t = 3.55) higher than foreign firms, and their required collateral
was 52 percentage points (t = 4.63) greater, after the inclusion of all controls in columns 3 and
6. As expected, the liberalization improved financing terms for home firms: their interest rate fell
by 3.9 percentage points (t = 3.67), and the required collateral fell by 31.2 percentage points (t =
2.86) (columns 3 and 6).
I examine changes in firms’ leverage by using the APEH database to estimate regression (9) on
the debt-to-sales ratio. Results presented in Table 9 confirm that domestic firms increased their
30These data come from the NBH, which conducts a representative labor survey at the firm level for the years
1999-2004, collecting information on employees’ education level. Following Bustos (2011), I construct this measure
as the share of skilled labor in total employment in primary school equivalents. I define skilled workers (S) as
college graduates plus tertiary education graduates converted to college equivalents, and unskilled workers (U) as
high school and primary school graduates converted to primary school equivalents. The conversion of workers to
college and primary school equivalents was done using the 1998 industrial sector wage premium. More formally, skill
intensity is measured as
SK(i,t) =
S(i,t)(ws/wu)1998
S(i,t)(ws/wu)1998 + U(i,t)
.
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leverage after the reform. The baseline regression, where only a dummy for domestic firm is in-
cluded, indicates a differential increase of 0.16 log point (t = 2.17) for domestic firms (column 1).
The inclusion of firm- and industry-level controls suggests a slightly larger increase of 0.23 log point
(t = 2.61). As expected, column 4 shows that the increase in leverage is larger for firms operating
in sectors with greater needs for external finance: one standard deviation increase in the index
of financial dependence raises domestic firms’ leverage by 0.15 log point (t = 1.98). Importantly,
consistent with the interpretation of the previous section that foreign firms were not credit con-
strained before the liberalization, foreign firms did not increase their leverage in accordance with
sector financial needs. Instead, the estimated coefficient is negative and statistically significant,
which could indicate a reallocation of financial funds towards domestic firms, as suggested above.
To test whether the expansion of domestic firms’ debt really coincides with the timing of the
financial liberalization, I estimate the effect by year. Results plotted in Figure 3 show that the
increase in domestic firms’ leverage only starts in 2001 and monotonically increases after it. The
F-test of equality of coefficients presented in Table A.17 confirms these results. While during the
years prior to the reform, the estimated coefficients on domestic firms’ leverage were not statistically
different, following the liberalization, they monotonically and significantly differ.
The results presented above provide support for the financial channel implied by the liber-
alization, as lowered financing terms allowed domestic firms to expand. The empirical evidence
also argues for the presence of pro-competitive forces, as foreign firms increased their productivity
in sectors where competition deepened the most. The next section advances the analysis of pro-
competitive forces by studying changes in foreign firms’ markups.
5.4 Foreign Firms’ Markups
Proposition 3 states that the improvement in financing terms for domestic firms deepens market
competition and leads to a reduction in foreign firms’ markups. I now turn to test this implication.
To compute firms’ markups, I follow De Loecker and Warzynski (2012) and derive them from
the firm’s optimal labor demand equation:
wt lijt = βj yijt
(
wt
β
)β(
Rt
α
)α
qijt
,
ξijt =
1
θijt
βj , (13)
where l is the firm’s optimal labor demand and y is its production; βj is the estimated labor
elasticity of the production function in sector j; w denotes the wage and R the interest rate; q
expresses the firm’s productivity; and θ represents the firm’s labor share. As shown in equation
(13), markups ξ are defined as a wedge between the firm’s labor share and the labor elasticity of
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production. I test for the differential decline in foreign firms’ markups using the following model:
∆ξij = δ1 + δ2Fi + δ3Zi + δ4Xj + δ5∆ψj +∆εij , (14)
where Fi is a dummy for foreign firms. In this model, δ2 captures the differential impact of the
reform on foreign firms’ markups. I control for firms’ initial characteristics as well as local and
global trends, and cluster the standard errors at the four-digit industry level as in equation (9).
Column 1 in Table 10 shows changes in markups regressed on a dummy for a foreign firm.
As predicted by the model, the estimated coefficient suggests a greater decrease in foreign firms’
markups of 0.017 log point (t = 1.9) relative to domestic firms. The inclusion of firm- and industry-
level controls does not significantly affect the results: on average, foreign firms’ markups drop by
0.026 log point (t = 2.26). This relative decrease in foreign firms’ markups is consistent with
the evidence presented in the previous sections and the model’s implications. As domestic firms
differentially increase their productivity, foreign firms’ cost advantage decreases and, therefore,
their markups fall relatively more. Note as well that the magnitude of the relative drop in foreign
firms’ markups (0.026 log point) is in line with the relative increase in domestic firms’ RTFP (0.032
log point).
For robustness, I compute markups using the elasticities of the production function estimated
with the De Loecker and Warzynski (2012) and Petrin and Levinsohn (2012) (with Wooldridge’s
2009 correction) methodologies. Table A.6 confirms the decline in foreign firms’ markups following
the financial liberalization and shows that this reduction is robust to either estimates of the produc-
tion function (Cobb-Douglas in the first case, and translog in the second). Results are also robust
to using the price-cost margin, which proxies markups as firm’s sales minus total costs over sales
following Aghion, Bloom, Blundell, Griffith, and Howitt (2005) (see column 3 of Table A.6). Addi-
tionally, I estimate equation (14) by year and test whether this decline coincides with the timing of
the reform. Results plotted in Figure 3 and presented in Table A.18 confirm the decrease in foreign
firms’ markups since 2001. As demonstrated by the F-test, the estimated coefficients on foreign
firms’ markups were not statistically different between 1998 and 2000, but they monotonically and
significantly differ in the years following the reform. I also estimate a falsification test for 1998 and
show that foreign firms’ markups did not change differently regarding their local competitors prior
to 2001 (Table A.19).31
As discussed above, asymmetric access to international capital markets undermines the com-
petitive pressure of domestic firms to a greater extent in sectors requiring more intensively external
finance. This weaker competition allows foreign companies to obtain higher markups. Hence, fi-
nancial liberalization should be associated with a greater decline in foreign firms’ markups in more
financially dependent sectors. To assess this implication, I test whether foreign firms’ markups dif-
ferentially decreased in these sectors by interacting the dummy for foreign firms with the financial
31Results on foreign firms’ markups are robust to controlling for subsidies and tax exemptions (Table A.20) and
firms with fewer than five employees (Table A.21).
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dependence index of Rajan and Zingales (1998). The estimated equation is
∆yij = δ1 + δ2Fi + δ3 FDj + δ4 (Fi xFDj) + δ5Zi + δ6Xj + δ7∆ψj +∆εij , (15)
where δ4 absorbs the differential effect on foreign firms in more financially dependent sectors. The
estimated coefficients are reported in column 4 of Table 10 and indicate that the reform is associated
with a relatively greater decline in foreign firms’ markups in those sectors. Foreign firms operating
in one standard deviation more financially dependent sector experience a 0.05 log point (t = 4.74)
larger decline in their markups. Importantly, this differential decrease in foreign firms’ markups
across sectors remains true when estimating markups using different methodologies (Table A.22)
and controlling for foreign firms that operate as export platforms (Table A.23). Note, finally, that
this greater decline in foreign firms’ markups in more financially dependent sectors is consistent
with the greater expansion of domestic firms in those sectors. It is interesting that the coeffi-
cient on financial dependence for domestic firms δ3 is positive and significant, suggesting that their
markups rose in sectors with higher financial needs. This result is in line with the greater productiv-
ity expansion observed in those sectors. As domestic firms’ productivity grew, so did their markups.
Firm-Level Evidence: Taking Stock
Sections 5.2 to 5.4 tested the model’s firm-level implications using data. First, I have shown that
the liberalization in Hungary is associated with increases in domestic firms’ capital intensity, labor
productivity, and RTFP, and in their probability of conducting R&D and innovation activities, in
line with Proposition 1. Second, I have provided direct evidence that domestic firms’ expansion
correlates with an improvement in financing terms and an increase in leverage, as stated in Propo-
sition 2. Third, the empirical results also point to the presence of pro-competitive forces as foreign
firms’ markups decreased (Proposition 3), particularly in sectors where competition was initially
more distorted. Furthermore, in those sectors, foreign firms expanded their labor productivity,
RTFP, and skill intensity.
5.5 Industry-Level Evidence: Technological Gap and Concentration
Proposition 4 states that the greater increase in domestic firms’ innovation efforts yields a decline
in the productivity gap between the domestic firms and their foreign-industry rivals, and that this
decline is greater in sectors where the initial productivity gap was widest. The previous sections
have shown that domestic firms have expanded their productivity to a relatively greater extent
than their foreign competitors, arguing for a reduction in the productivity gap between them. In
this section, I test whether this decline is higher in sectors where the initial gap was larger and
whether it is parallel to changes in industry concentration.
Proposition 4 refers to the gap in physical productivity between foreign and domestic firms.
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Unfortunately, the lack of information on firms’ prices does not allow for recovering their physical
productivity and, thus, assessing this proposition directly against the data. However, through the
lens of the model, markups and RTFP are proportional to the productivity gap and, hence, can be
employed as proxies for it (see equation (2) and Appendix B.1). Therefore, one could regress
∆κj = α+ βκj + εj ,
where κj denotes the markup or RTFP difference between the 50th percentile foreign and home firms
in each three-digit industry j before the reform (1998-2000), and ∆ denotes the change between
the pre- and post-reform period (1998-2000 and 2002-2004). A negative β would imply that the
productivity gap fell more in sectors where the initial gap was largest. A potential drawback of
this regression is that it does not consider pre-existing trends within sectors. To account for this,
I include a third period of analysis, 1996-1997, and estimate the following model:
∆κjt = α+ β1κjt + β2Tt + β3(κjt ∗ Tt) + εjt, (16)
where t denotes the period, and Tt is a dummy indicating the reform. The change after the reform,
taking into account pre-existing trends, is captured by the coefficient β3 of the interaction term.
Table 11 reports the results for the RTFP and markups gaps. In line with Proposition 4, it
shows a greater decrease in the RTFP gap in sectors where its initial level was larger. After the
inclusion of historial trends in column 3, the estimated coefficient implies that an increase of one
standard deviation in the initial RTFP dispersion narrows the RTFP gap between foreign and
domestic firms by 15% following the reform. Similarly, the estimated coefficient for markups is
negative and statistically significant, indicating that an increase of one standard deviation in the
initial markup dispersion narrows the markup gap between foreign and home firms by 13% (column
6). The reduction in the RTFP and markup gaps within sectors should be parallel to a decrease in
the level of industry concentration, particularly in sectors that were initially more concentrated.32
To test this, I follow Nickell (1996) and Aghion, Bloom, Blundell, Griffith, and Howitt (2005),
and use the Lerner index as a measure of concentration. Column 9 in Table 11 confirms that the
liberalization is associated with a larger decrease in the Lerner index in sectors that were initially
more concentrated. After the inclusion of pre-existing trends, the estimated coefficient implies that
an increase of one standard deviation in the initial Lerner index drops the industry concentration
by 3% following the reform.
32Prior to the reform, the Hungarian manufacturing sector presented high levels of market concentration. Foreign
firms’ share in total value added was 74%, and the Lerner and Herfindahl indexes of industry concentration were high
at 0.22 and 0.40. Importantly, by 2004, market competition had increased: foreign firms’ market share had dropped
6 percentage points, and the Lerner and Herfindahl indexes had shrunk by 10% and 7.5%.
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5.6 Aggregate Productivity Growth
This section assesses whether the expansion in firms’ productivity correlates with an increase in
aggregate productivity growth, as stated in Proposition 5. Additionally, it conducts a decompo-
sition exercise to understand the contribution of within-firm and reallocation effects in aggregate
productivity growth.
In the late nineties, aggregate productivity was growing at a fast pace in Hungary. Three years
prior to the liberalization –between 1998 and 2000– aggregate productivity grew at 5.8% per year.
The financial liberalization correlates with an acceleration in this growth. Within the three years
after the reform (2002-2004), aggregate productivity grew at 9.6% per year and at 8.5% within the
five years after it. Importantly, a structural test in the aggregate productivity trend confirms this
result, even after controlling for other reforms such as the trade liberalization in 1996, the accession
to the EU in 2004, and a falsification test for 1998 (Table A.24).
To understand the source of the increase in aggregate productivity growth and how it relates
to the expansion in firms’ productivity reported above, I follow a decomposition exercise in the
spirit of Petrin and Levinsohn (2012). In particular, I break down aggregate productivity growth
into a component related to changes in technical efficiency (TE) and a component aggregating the
reallocation effects (RE). The technical efficiency component reflects the contribution of increases in
firms’ efficiency to growth, holding inputs constant. More precisely, this term is the sum of changes
in a firm’s RTFP weighted by the firm’s share in total value added. The reallocation term arises
from wedges between the input elasticities and input shares in production. As is well established
in the misallocation literature, in the presence of these wedges, reallocation of inputs across firms
can affect aggregate RTFP (Restuccia and Rogerson 2008; Hsieh and Klenow 2009, among others).
Formally, this term is the sum of the net gain in the allocation of inputs across firms weighted by
the firm’s share in value added. Hence, as in Petrin and Levinsohn (2012), aggregate RTFP growth
can be expressed as
∆RTFPt = TEt +REt =
Nt∑
i,t
Dit∆RTFPit +
Nt∑
i,t
Zt∑
i,z,t
Dit(εizt − θizt)∆Zizt, (17)
where i and t denote firm and year; Nt denotes the total number of firms in the economy; Dit is
the firm’s share in total value added, where the weight is computed as the average between t and
t − 1; ∆RTFPit is the firm’s RTFP growth; Z denotes inputs: capital and labor; ε is the input
elasticity; and θ is the input share in value added.
Panel A of Table 12 presents the average growth rate of aggregate RTFP and its components
within the three years before and after the reform (1998-2000 and 2002-2004). Panel B reports
the source of this growth. As shown in Panel A, prior to the liberalization, aggregate productivity
growth was growing at 5.8% per year, from which 4.8% was explained by reallocation effects and
only 1% by increases in within-firm productivity. Remarkably, this pattern of growth reversed
after the financial liberalization. Following the reform, aggregate productivity accelerated to 9.6%
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per year; of this amount, within-firm productivity accounted for 7.9%, and reallocation effects
accounted for only 1.7%. As a result, within-firm productivity turned to explain the bulk of the
expansion in aggregate RTFP, which was 82% after the liberalization (Panel B). The rise in within-
firm productivity is explained mostly by the balanced panel of firms used above (column 4).33
What created these two opposite patterns of growth before and after the financial liberaliza-
tion? Or, put differently, why did within-firm productivity grow at such a low pace before the
reform and at such a high pace after it? The conjecture that emerges from this paper is that it is
the change in all firms’ incentives to invest in technology that raises within-firm productivity. In
particular, according to the mechanism studied in this paper, distortions in the access to capital
markets undermine competition and economy-wide innovation incentives. It is then natural that
before the reform, within-firm productivity grew at a low pace. By reducing distortions in the
access to international capital markets across firms, financial liberalization relaxes the financing
terms of firms that were previously discriminated against and unchains the pro-competitive forces
that led both discriminated and non-discriminated firms to invest more in technology. As all firms
increase their productivity, within-firm productivity becomes a key driver of aggregate productivity
growth.
6 Conclusion
The debate about the desirability of international financial flows is nowadays at the center of
the discussion of researchers and policy makers. This paper focuses on one key aspect of capital
controls: their impact on firms’ access to capital markets and their consequences for competition
and aggregate productivity growth.
Throughout the paper, I have shown that capital controls can create asymmetric access to
external finance across firms, undermining market competition and economy-wide investment in
technology. In developing economies with sufficiently developed financial systems, capital account
openness can lead to economic growth. Capital inflows reduce asymmetric access to capital markets
across firms, promoting market competition and a broad-based expansion in productivity growth.
Firms that were previously policy discriminated invest more in technology because they face better
financing terms. Non-discriminated firms also innovate more due to deeper competition.
This paper also sheds light on the current debate on capital controls. It is often argued that
countries might consider it beneficial to encourage foreign direct investment and discourage finan-
cial flows. The evidence presented in this paper warns about possible distortions created by this
policy. By restricting financial flows, capital controls can reduce local credit and tighten financing
terms for domestic firms. This creates asymmetric access to external funds between domestic and
33This large increase in within-firm productivity is consistent with Bollard, Klenow, and Sharma (2013), who also
find that the bulk of the increase in aggregate productivity in India following structural reforms is explained by the
expansion of within-firm productivity.
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foreign firms, which reduces the competitive pressure of the former and allows foreign companies
to obtain higher markups, resulting in lower investment and economic growth. Viewed through
the lens of the paper, non-FDI flows might benefit the economy by reducing asymmetric access to
capital markets across firms and increasing credit for domestic companies.
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Table 1: Credit Market Before and After the Liberalization
Aggregate Economy (in %) Before After
Credit-to-GDP ratio 27 44
Credit-to-deposit ratio 83 113
Lending interest rate 12.8 7.5
Firms
Credits to small and medium firms 34 51
Small and medium firms’ debt in FX 0 33
Interest rate differential b. Home and Foreign 3.2 0.65
Differential in collateral b. Home and Foreign 58 11
Notes: For rows 1-5, the source is National Bank of Hungary, and data correspond to Decem-
ber 2000 and December 2004. Rows 6-7 come from Business Environment and Enterprise
Performance Surveys of the World Bank and the European Bank for Reconstruction and
Development (surveys 2002 and 2005).
Table 2: Mean Characteristics of Home and Foreign Firms (1998): APEH Database
Foreign Home Difference in
Means
(In logs)
Value added 10.6549 9.0769 1.5779***
(0.0525) (0.0226) (0.0500)
Employment 3.8952 2.8602 1.0349***
(0.0429) (0.0191) (0.0418)
Labor productivity 6.7596 6.2167 0.5429***
(0.0263) (0.0131) (0.0278)
RTFP 1.4093 1.1959 0.2133***
(0.0267) (0.0139) (0.0291)
Markup 0.2391 0.1774 0.0617***
(0.0159) (0.0098) (0.0197)
Age 1.6167 1.4777 0.1390***
(0.0136) (0.0090) (0.0179)
Number of firms 1,283 4,165 5,448
Notes: *, **, *** significant at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level. Standard errors in parentheses.
Source: APEH.
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Table 3: Mean Characteristics of Home and Foreign Firms (2001): BEEPS Database
Foreign Home Difference in
Means
Probability of innovation 0.5946 0.3521 0.2425***
(0.0818) (0.0328) (0.0858)
Probability of R&D 0.3206 0.1675 0.1532***
(0.0647) (0.0267) (0.0614)
Interest rate paid 9.0667 13.3198 -4.2531***
(0.9200) (0.5845) (1.2687)
Required value of collateral 124.2105 185.2874 -61.0768***
(13.7504) (11.5619) (25.6236)
Number of firms 53 197 250
Notes: *, **, *** significant at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level. Standard errors in parentheses.
Source: BEEPS.
Table 4: Growth Rates Preceding the Reform
Balanced Panel Home Foreign Difference in Means
Capital intensity 0.0235 0.0289 -0.0054
(0.0032) (0.0040) (0.0061)
Labor productivity 0.0554 0.0697 -0.0143
(0.0043) (0.0074) (0.0087)
RTFP 0.0264 0.0395 -0.0132
(0.0041) (0.0071) (0.0082)
Markup -0.0076 0.0058 -0.0133*
(0.0040) (0.0068) (0.0080)
Leverage -0.0077 0.0364 -0.0441
(0.0345) (0.0644) (0.0692)
N 17,765 5,654 23,419
Notes: *, **, *** significant at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level. Standard errors in parentheses. The table reports
the mean of the variable growth rate within the five years prior to the reform (1996-2000). Source: APEH.
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Table 5: Investment in Capital and Productivity
∆ Capital Intensity ∆ Labor Productivity ∆ RTFP
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Home 0.239*** 0.253*** 0.252*** 0.074*** 0.051*** 0.053*** 0.098*** 0.032** 0.032**
(0.023) (0.025) (0.025) (0.017) (0.017) (0.016) (0.015) (0.014) (0.016)
Firm-level controls yes yes yes yes yes yes
Local trends yes yes yes
Global trends yes yes yes
R2 0.019 0.030 0.030 0.004 0.027 0.040 0.008 0.075 0.088
N 5,448 5,448 5,448 5,448 5,448 5,448 5,448 5,448 5,448
Notes: *, **, *** significant at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level. Standard errors are clustered at four-digit NACE industries. All
regressions include a constant term. Global industry controls include capital intensity and TFP growth rates of the four-digit
NACE industries in the United States between 1998 and 2004. Local industry controls are capital intensity and RTFP average
growth rates at the four-digit level in Hungary in the late 90s. Firm-level controls are age, employment and RTFP in the initial
year (1998). Source: APEH.
Table 6: R&D and Innovation Activities
R&D Activities Innovation Activities
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Home -0.153*** -0.058 -0.032 -0.242*** -0.158** -0.090
(0.028) (0.032) (0.030) (0.057) (0.054) (0.056)
Home*Reform 0.107* 0.083** 0.090* 0.176** 0.167** 0.122*
(0.048) (0.033) (0.044) (0.066) (0.055) (0.056)
Reform 0.023 0.046 0.023 -0.084 -0.071 -0.099
(0.055) (0.052) (0.043) (0.063) (0.075) (0.081)
Firm-level controls yes yes yes yes
Sector-fixed effects yes yes
R2 0.019 0.064 0.081 0.014 0.037 0.069
N 774 774 774 774 774 774
Notes: *, **, *** significant at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level. Standard errors are clustered at industry level. All
regressions include a constant term. R&D is a dummy if the firm reports positive R&D expenditures. Innovation
is a dummy if a firm reports any of the following activities: successfully developed a major product line, upgraded
an existing product line, acquired a new production technology, obtained a new licensing agreement, and obtained
a new quality accreditation. Firm-level controls are age and size. Source: BEEPS.
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Table 7: Financial Dependence: Investment in Capital and Productivity
∆ Capital Intensity ∆ Labor Productivity ∆ RTFP
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Home 0.210*** 0.221*** 0.219*** 0.058*** 0.017 0.015 0.083*** -0.010 -0.016
(0.021) (0.024) (0.024) (0.017) (0.015) (0.017) (0.018) (0.023) (0.023)
Home * Fin. dep. 0.142* 0.156* 0.155* 0.093* 0.155*** 0.147*** 0.087 0.181** 0.167**
(0.080) (0.076) (0.077) (0.053) (0.045) (0.046) (0.072) (0.080) (0.067)
Fin. dep. -0.084 -0.061 -0.053 0.276** 0.320** 0.334** 0.162 0.222** 0.277***
(0.064) (0.070) (0.077) (0.124) (0.124) (0.134) (0.107) (0.10) (0.092)
Firm-level controls yes yes yes yes yes yes
Local trends yes yes yes
Global trends yes yes yes
R2 0.020 0.031 0.031 0.034 0.074 0.081 0.022 0.111 0.120
N 5,143 5,143 5,143 5,143 5,143 5,143 5,143 5,143 5,143
Notes: *, **, *** significant at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level. Standard errors are clustered at four-digit NACE
industries. All regressions include a constant term. Financial Dependence is the Rajan and Zingales’ (1998) index.
Global industry controls include capital intensity and TFP growth rates of the four-digit NACE industries in the
United States between 1998 and 2004. Local industry controls are capital intensity and RTFP average growth
rates at the four-digit level in Hungary in the late 90s. Firm-level controls are age, employment and RTFP in the
initial year (1998). Source: APEH.
Table 8: Financing Terms
Interest Rate Value of Collateral
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Home 4.253*** 3.707*** 3.729*** 60.789*** 49.174** 52.106***
(1.132) (1.027) (1.051) (15.391) (15.727) (11.263)
Home*Reform -3.879** -3.858*** -3.947*** -37.653* -35.438* -31.170**
(1.134) (1.018) (1.076) (17.130) (17.104) (10.911)
Reform -0.026 -0.159 -0.221 20.968 19.574 13.368
(0.951) (0.830) (0.890) (12.571) (13.192) (11.635)
Firm-level controls yes yes yes yes
Sector- fixed effects yes yes
R2 0.175 0.202 0.217 0.035 0.045 0.103
N 415 415 415 399 399 399
Notes: *, **, *** significant at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level. Standard errors are clustered at industry level. All
regressions include a constant term. Firm-level controls are age and size. Source: BEEPS.
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Table 9: Leverage
∆ Leverage
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Home 0.160** 0.239*** 0.230*** 0.238**
(0.073) (0.085) (0.088) (0.100)
Home* Fin. dep. 0.526**
(0.266)
Financial dependence -0.595**
(0.234)
Firm-level controls yes yes yes
Local trends yes yes
Global trends yes yes
R2 0.002 0.006 0.007 0.015
N 2,742 2,742 2,742 2,742
Notes: *, **, *** significant at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level. Standard errors are clustered at four-
digit NACE industries. All regressions include a constant term. Financial dependence is the Rajan
and Zingales (1998) index. Global industry controls include capital intensity and TFP growth rates
of the four-digit NACE industries in the United States between 1998 and 2004. Local industry
controls are capital intensity and RTFP average growth rates at the four-digit level in Hungary in
the late 90s. Firm-level controls are age, employment and RTFP in the initial year (1998). Source:
APEH.
Table 10: Foreign Firms’ Markups
∆ Markups
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Foreign -0.017* -0.025** -0.026** 0.030*
(0.009) (0.011) (0.012) (0.016)
Foreign*Fin. dep. -0.205***
(0.043)
Financial dependence 0.212***
(0.069)
Firm-level control yes yes yes
Local trend yes yes
Global trends yes yes
R2 0.000 0.023 0.024 0.057
N 5,376 5,376 5,376 5,086
Notes: *, **, *** significant at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level. Standard errors are
clustered at four-digit NACE industries. All regressions include a constant term. Fi-
nancial dependence is the Rajan and Zingales (1998) index. Global industry controls
include capital intensity and TFP growth rates of the four-digit NACE industries in
the United States between 1998 and 2004. Local industry controls are capital inten-
sity and RTFP average growth rates at the four-digit level in Hungary in the late
90s. Firm-level controls are age, employment and RTFP in the initial year (1998).
Source: APEH.
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Table 11: Markup and RTFP Dispersions and Industry Concentration
Change in RTFP Dispersion Change in Markup Dispersion Change in Concentration
Late 90s Reform Accounting for Late 90s Reform Accounting for Late 90s Reform Accounting for
Pre-
trends
Pre-
trends
Pre-
trends
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Initial value -0.076 -0.202** -0.076 -0.419*** -0.730*** -0.419*** -0.177*** -0.317*** -0.177***
(0.064) (0.079) (0.077) (0.063) (0.135) (0.079) (0.075) (0.085) (0.060)
Initial value*T -0.222** -0.310** -0.245***
(0.107) (0.140) (0.091)
T 0.186 0.134** 0.211***
(0.128) (0.054) (0.072)
R2 0.018 0.074 0.100 0.354 0.280 0.325 0.101 0.145 0.223
N 82 82 164 78 78 156 82 82 164
Notes: All regressions include a constant term. *, **, *** significant at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level. Standard errors in
parentheses. Three-digit NACE industries correlations. Source: APEH.
Table 12: Contribution to Aggregate RTFP Growth
Total Sample Balanced
Panel
∆RTFP Reallocation Within- Within-
Firm Firm
(1) (2) (3) (4)
A: Mean Growth Rate
Before 5.8 4.8 1.0 0.9
After 9.6 1.7 7.9 7.3
B: Contribution to Aggregate RTFP Growth (wrt column 1)
Before 100.0 83.5 16.5 16.5
After 100.0 18.0 82.0 75.4
Notes: In %. Source: APEH.
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Additional Figures, Robustness Tests,
and Model’s Additional Derivations
and Extensions
(Not for publication)
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Additional Tables: Robustness Tests
Table A.1: Firm Survival Ratio
Firm Survival
Home Foreign Difference in
Means
Survival ratio 0.8672 0.8579 0.0092
(0.0026) (0.0060) (0.0064)
N 16,826 3,323 20,149
Notes: *, **, *** significant at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level. Standard errors in parentheses. The table
reports the mean of a dummy variable on surviving after the reform. In particular, for all existing firms
prior to the reform (in 2000), surviving = 1 if the firm did not exit within the three years following the
reform (2002-2004), and 0 otherwise. Source: APEH.
Table A.2: Number of Banks in Hungary
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Number of banks 43 43 43 45 45 45 45 44 44 44 44
Source: National Bank of Hungary.
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Table A.3: Robustness Test: Investment in Capital and Productivity
∆ Capital Intensity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Home 0.249*** 0.171*** 0.254*** 0.241*** 0.282***
(0.026) (0.031) (0.027) (0.026) (0.026)
Firm-level controls yes yes yes yes yes
Sector-fixed effects yes
Local trends yes yes yes yes
Global trends yes yes yes yes
R2 0.060 0.019 0.029 0.029 0.031
N 5,448 4,747 4,950 4,881 5,158
∆ Labor Productivity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Home 0.046*** 0.070*** 0.052*** 0.061*** 0.060***
(0.015) (0.020) (0.018) (0.016) (0.017)
Firm-level controls yes yes yes yes yes
Sector-fixed effects yes
Local trends yes yes yes yes
Global trends yes yes yes yes
R2 0.235 0.040 0.039 0.029 0.040
N 5,448 4,747 4,950 4,881 5,158
∆ RTFP
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Home 0.032* 0.057*** 0.031* 0.039** 0.039**
(0.016) (0.020) (0.018) (0.017) (0.018)
Firm-level controls yes yes yes yes yes
Sector-fixed effects yes
Local trends yes yes yes yes
Global trends yes yes yes yes
R2 0.155 0.088 0.086 0.077 0.087
N 5,448 4,747 4,950 4,881 5,158
Notes: *, **, *** significant at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level. Standard errors are clustered at four-digit NACE industries. All regressions
include a constant term. Global industry controls include capital intensity and TFP growth rates of the four-digit NACE industries in the
United States between 1998 and 2004. Local industry controls are capital intensity and TFP average growth rates at the four-digit level
in Hungary in the late 90s. Firm-level controls are age, employment and RTFP in the initial year (1998). Column 1 controls for four-digit
industry fixed effects. Column 2 removes those foreign firms whose foreign shares exceed more than 75% of total shares on average between
1998 and 2000. Column 3 restricts the analysis to foreign firms that are not used as export platforms (more than 75% of exports). Column
4 removes the top 1 percentile of firms (in value added). Column 5 controls for firms that change the ownership status between the pre- and
post-reform periods. Source: APEH.
49
Table A.4: Credit Market Before the Liberalization: Home Firms
Exporters Non-Exporters Difference in
Means
Paid interest rate 13.3250 13.2015 0.1234
(1.5917) (0.6585) (1.5478)
Required collateral 4.8618 5.0060 -0.1441
(0.1301) (0.0479) (0.1134)
Leverage 0.0952 0.0977 0.0025
(0.0058) (0.0054) (0.0086)
Notes: *, **, *** significant at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level. Standard errors in parentheses. Rows
1 and 2 come from Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Surveys of the World Bank
and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, for the years 2001 and 2004. Row 3
uses APEH data. The debt-to-sales ratio is computed using short-term debt over sales. Row 2 is
in logs.
Table A.5: Investment in Capital and Productivity: Home Exporters vs.
Non-Exporters
∆ Capital Intensity ∆ Labor Productivity ∆ RTFP
(1) (2) (3)
Home 0.255*** 0.060*** 0.034*
(0.027) (0.019) (0.018)
Home*Exporter -0.012 -0.023 -0.004
(0.025) (0.025) (0.020)
Firm controls yes yes yes
Local trends yes yes yes
Global trends yes yes yes
R2 0.030 0.041 0.088
N 5,448 5,448 5,448
Notes: *, **, *** significant at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level. Standard errors are clustered at four-digit NACE
industries. All regressions include a constant term. Exporter is defined as having an average export share larger
than 0.05 between 1998 and 2000. Global industry controls include capital intensity and TFP growth rates of
the four-digit NACE industries in the United States between 1998 and 2004. Local industry controls are capital
intensity and RTFP average growth rates at the four-digit level in Hungary in the late 90s. Firm-level controls
are age, employment and RTFP in the initial year (1998). Source: APEH.
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Table A.6: Robustness Test: RTFP and Markups
∆ RTFP ∆ Markups
WLP DLTL PCM WLP DLTL
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Home 0.028*** 0.081***
(0.009) (0.026)
Foreign -0.127** -0.034*** -0.024*
(0.051) (0.011) (0.013)
Firm-level controls yes yes yes yes yes
Local trends yes yes yes yes yes
Global trends yes yes yes yes yes
R2 0.034 0.065 0.006 0.028 0.019
N 4,864 4,839 5,029 4,864 4,839
Notes: *, **, *** significant at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level. Standard errors are clustered at four-digit NACE
industries. All regressions include a constant term. Global industry controls include capital intensity and TFP
growth rates of the four-digit NACE industries in the United States between 1998 and 2004. Local industry
controls are capital intensity and TFP growth rates at the four-digit level in Hungary in the late 90s. Firm-
level controls are age, employment and RTFP in the initial year (1998). Column 1 reports the RTFP measure
with the coefficients of the production function estimated following Wooldridge (2009) and Petrin and Levinsohn
(2012) methodology. Column 2 reports the RTFP of the translog production function using the De Loecker and
Warzynski (2012) methodology to estimate the elasticities of the factor of production. Column 3 reports the
price-cost margin estimated as in Aghion, Bloom, Blundell, Griffith, and Howitt (2005). Column 4 and 5 present
the markup estimated using the elasticities computed for columns 1 and 2, and following equation (13). Source:
APEH.
Table A.7: Robustness Tests: Subsidies and Exceptions II
∆ Capital Intensity ∆ Labor Productivity ∆ RTFP ∆ Leverage
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Home 0.254*** 0.224*** 0.054*** 0.018 0.034** -0.014 0.233*** 0.239**
(0.025) (0.023) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.023) (0.088) (0.100)
Home* Fin. dep. 0.146* 0.142*** 0.164** 0.526**
(0.077) (0.047) (0.068) (0.266)
Fin. dep. -0.045 0.339** 0.279*** -0.594**
(0.078) (0.133) (0.092) (0.234)
Subsidy and tax ex. -0.313** -0.294** -0.032 -0.037 -0.240* -0.267** -0.560 -0.146
(0.152) (0.126) (0.164) (0.109) (0.123) (0.123) (0.671) (0.568)
(Other) Firm controls yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Local trends yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Global trends yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
R2 0.030 0.031 0.041 0.081 0.089 0.122 0.008 0.015
N 5,448 5,143 5,448 5,143 5,448 5,143 2,742 2,742
Notes: *, **, *** significant at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level. Standard errors are clustered at four-digit NACE industries. All regressions include a constant
term. Global industry controls include capital intensity and TFP growth rates of the four-digit NACE industries in the United States between 1998 and
2004. Local industry controls are capital intensity and RTFP average growth rates at the four-digit level in Hungary in the late 90s. Firm-level controls
are subsidies and tax exceptions over sales, age, employment and RTFP in the initial year (1998). Source: APEH.
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Table A.8: Robustness Tests: All Firms
∆ Capital Intensity ∆ Labor Productivity ∆ RTFP ∆ Leverage
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Home 0.218*** 0.177*** 0.090*** -0.014 0.067*** 0.004 0.204*** 0.082
(0.028) (0.036) (0.021) (0.025) (0.023) (0.019) (0.079) (0.104)
Home* Fin. dep. 0.189* 0.138** 0.115** 0.551**
(0.092) (0.069) (0.055) (0.275)
Fin. dep. -0.153* 0.427*** 0.269** -0.355
(0.081) (0.062) (0.116) (0.237)
Firm-level controls yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Local trends yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Global trends yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
R2 0.019 0.023 0.021 0.103 0.065 0.082 0.007 0.008
N 7,247 6,930 7,247 6,930 7,247 6,930 3,138 3,104
Notes: *, **, *** significant at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level. Std. errors are clustered at four-digit NACE industries. All regressions include a constant
term. Global industry controls include capital intensity and TFP growth rates of the four-digit NACE industries in the United States between 1998 and
2004. Local industry controls are capital intensity and RTFP average growth rates at the four-digit level in Hungary in the late 90s. Firm-level controls
are age, employment and RTFP in the initial year (1998). Source: APEH.
Table A.9: Panel Regressions: Investment in Capital and Productivity
Log Capital Intensity Log Labor Productivity Log RTFP
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Home*Reform 0.208*** 0.251*** 0.231*** 0.062*** 0.070*** 0.043*** 0.076*** 0.056*** 0.051***
(0.015) (0.015) (0.016) (0.012) (0.016) (0.014) (0.012) (0.017) (0.014)
Reform 0.017 0.099*** 0.020
(0.016) (0.017) (0.015)
Firm FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Sector*Year FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Balanced panel no no yes no no yes no no yes
R2 0.880 0.882 0.871 0.784 0.791 0.805 0.809 0.814 0.826
N 59,976 59,976 38,136 60,864 60,864 38,136 59,771 59,771 38,136
Notes: *, **, *** significant at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level. Standard errors are clustered at year and four-digit NACE industries. All regressions include
firm-fixed effects. Regressions (2), (3), (5), (6), (8), (9) include four-digit NACE industries-year fixed effects. Regressions (1), (2), (4), (5), (7) and (8)
include all firms with five or more employees. Regressions (3), (6) and (9) are estimated for the balance panel employed in Table 5. Source: APEH.
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Table A.10: Results by Industry
Differential Impact on
Home Firms Foreign Firms
∆ Capital ∆ Labor ∆ RTFP ∆ Leverage ∆ Markups
Intensity Productivity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
H*Food & Beverage 0.266*** 0.131*** 0.106*** 0.270*** -0.031**
(Foreign in col (5)) (0.066) (0.009) (0.011) (0.025) (0.011)
H*Textiles 0.132* 0.021*** 0.001 0.256*** 0.049***
(Foreign in col (5)) (0.068) (0.005) (0.004) (0.020) (0.004)
H*Wood and of Wood 0.300*** 0.158*** 0.128*** 0.185*** -0.076***
(Foreign in col (5)) (0.109) (0.003) (0.002) (0.010) (0.002)
H*Pulp, Paper & Printing 0.285*** -0.007 -0.069*** 0.406*** 0.015**
(Foreign in col (5)) (0.047) (0.007) (0.005) (0.019) (0.005)
H*Chemical, Rubber & Plastic 0.191*** 0.022*** -0.008 0.425*** -0.013*
(Foreign in col (5)) (0.055) (0.006) (0.006) (0.023) (0.006)
H*Basic Metals 0.322*** 0.076*** 0.048*** 0.300*** -0.032***
(Foreign in col (5)) (0.067) (0.006) (0.016) (0.016) (0.005)
H*Machinery 0.245*** 0.047*** -0.016*** -0.472*** -0.057***
(Foreign in col (5)) (0.039) (0.006) (0.017) (0.017) (0.005)
H*Electrical Equipment 0.292*** 0.008 0.033* 0.440*** -0.028***
(Foreign in col (5)) (0.058) (0.020) (0.048) (0.047) (0.007)
H*Transport 0.334*** 0.138*** 0.166*** 0.192*** -0.054***
(Foreign in col (5)) (0.127) (0.012) (0.027) (0.029) (0.010)
H*Manufacturing NEC 0.174** 0.105*** 0.080*** 0.169*** -0.052***
(Foreign in col (5)) (0.079) (0.006) (0.004) (0.021) (0.004)
Firm-level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Global trends Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Local trends Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.037 0.144 0.199 0.017 0.059
N 5,448 5,448 5,448 2,742 5,376
Notes: *, **, *** significant at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level. Standard errors are clustered at industry level. Columns (1)-(4) report the
differential impact of the reform on home firms’ capital intensity, labor productivity, RTFP and leverage. Column (5) presents the differential
impact of the reform on foreign firms’ markups. All regressions include sector fixed-effects at two-digit NACE industries. Global industry
controls include capital intensity and TFP growth rates of the four-digit NACE industries in the United States between 1998 and 2004. Local
industry controls are capital intensity and RTFP average growth rates at the four-digit level in Hungary in the late 90s. Firm-level controls
are age, employment and RTFP in the initial year (1998). Source: APEH.
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Table A.11: Falsification Test: Effect by Year
Log Capital Intensity Log Labor Productivity Log RTFP
(1) (2) (3)
1998*Home -0.636*** -0.428*** -0.094***
(0.041) (0.027) (0.013)
1999*Home -0.623*** -0.461*** -0.116***
(0.038) (0.030) (0.019)
2000*Home -0.602*** -0.447*** -0.107***
(0.034) (0.029) (0.018)
2001*Home -0.504*** -0.389*** -0.059***
(0.035) (0.028) (0.019)
2002*Home -0.462*** -0.357*** -0.009
(0.035) (0.031) (0.019)
2003*Home -0.411*** -0.376*** -0.038**
(0.034) (0.025) (0.019)
2004*Home -0.370*** -0.337*** 0.029
(0.036) (0.025) (0.020)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Sector FE Yes Yes Yes
Firm-level controls Yes Yes Yes
Global trends Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.971 0.989 0.894
N 38,136 38,136 38,136
F Tests on Equality of Coefficients
F-stat: 1998*Home=2000*Home 0.41 0.24 0.37
pvalue 0.5216 0.6257 0.5413
F-stat: 2000*Home=2002*Home 8.83 4.76 14.45
pvalue 0.0030 0.0293 0.0002
F-stat: 2000*Home=2003*Home 16.58 3.66 7.20
pvalue 0.0000 0.0558 0.0074
F-stat: 2000*Home=2004*Home 23.67 8.57 25.47
pvalue 0.0000 0.0035 0.0000
Notes: *, **, *** significant at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level. Standard errors are clustered at year and four-digit NACE industries.
Global industry controls include capital intensity and TFP of the four-digit NACE industries in the United States between 1998 and
2004. Firm-level controls are employment, labor productivity and age in the initial year (1998). All regressions include four-digit
industries fixed-effects. Source: APEH.
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Table A.12: Falsification Test-Year 1998: Investment in Capital and Productivity
∆ Capital Intensity ∆ Labor Productivity ∆ RTFP
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Home 0.012 0.027 0.023 -0.018 -0.025 -0.022 0.020 -0.017 -0.016
(0.022) (0.021) (0.020) (0.020) (0.021) (0.021) (0.017) (0.018) (0.018)
Firm controls yes yes yes yes yes yes
Local trends yes yes yes
Global trends yes yes yes
R2 0.000 0.011 0.018 0.000 0.048 0.062 0.000 0.118 0.121
N 4,366 4,366 4,366 4,366 4,366 4,366 4,366 4,366 4,366
Notes: *, **, *** significant at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level. Period 1996-2000. Standard errors are clustered at four-digit NACE industries. All regressions
include a constant term. Global industry controls include capital intensity and TFP growth rates of the four-digit NACE industries in the Unites States
between 1996-2000. Local industry controls are capital intensity and RTFP average growth rates at the four-digit level in Hungary in the early 90s.
Firm-level controls are age, employment and RTFP in the initial year (1996). Source: APEH.
Table A.13: Quartiles of Financial Dependence: Investment in Capital and
Productivity
∆ Capital Intensity ∆ Labor Productivity ∆ RTFP
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Home*1(Fin.Dep.=1) 0.225*** 0.234*** 0.234*** 0.058*** 0.017 0.034 0.087*** -0.009 -0.014
(0.033) (0.035) (0.035) (0.013) (0.034) (0.031) (0.015) (0.027) (0.028)
Home*1(Fin.Dep.=2) 0.226*** 0.226*** 0.228*** 0.089* 0.057** 0.052* 0.089* 0.024 0.022
(0.050) (0.047) (0.046) (0.043) (0.028) (0.029) (0.044) (0.042) (0.042)
Home*1(Fin.Dep.=3) 0.271*** 0.285*** 0.279*** 0.067*** 0.051* 0.051* 0.083*** 0.042* 0.036*
(0.056) (0.055) (0.054) (0.020) (0.026) (0.026) (0.021) (0.022) (0.022)
Home*1(Fin.Dep.=4) 0.253*** 0.292*** 0.298*** 0.077** 0.080** 0.091** 0.156*** 0.083** 0.075**
(0.041) (0.040) (0.042) (0.030) (0.031) (0.035) (0.047) (0.038) (0.036)
1(Fin.Dep.=2) 0.014 0.033 0.028 0.132 0.160*** 0.172*** 0.118 0.138** 0.134**
(0.057) (0.054) (0.054) (0.086) (0.051) (0.051) (0.071) (0.064) (0.061)
1(Fin.Dep.=3) -0.007 0.004 -0.010 0.139* 0.160*** 0.180*** 0.106 0.125** 0.119**
(0.043) (0.044) (0.046) (0.078) (0.054) (0.052) (0.068) (0.051) (0.051)
1(Fin.Dep.=4) -0.018 -0.015 -0.034 0.163* 0.190*** 0.187*** 0.055 0.124** 0.143**
(0.056) (0.059) (0.072) (0.088) (0.057) (0.061) (0.080) (0.058) (0.057)
Firm-level controls yes yes yes yes yes yes
Local trends yes yes yes
Global trends yes yes yes
R2 0.020 0.031 0.032 0.030 0.069 0.082 0.022 0.109 0.114
N 5,143 5,143 5,143 5,143 5,143 5,143 5,143 5,143 5,143
Notes: *, **, *** significant at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level. Standard errors are clustered at four-digit NACE industries. All regressions
include a constant term. Financial dependence is the Rajan and Zingales’ (1998) index. Global industry controls include capital intensity and
TFP growth rates of the four-digit NACE industries in the United States between 1998 and 2004. Local industry controls are capital intensity
and RTFP average growth rates at the four-digit level in Hungary in the late 90s. Firm-level controls are age, employment and RTFP in the
initial year (1998). Source: APEH.
55
Table A.14: Financial Dependence: Investment in Capital and Productivity-
Robustness Test
∆ Capital Intensity ∆ Labor Productivity ∆ RTFP
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Home 0.246*** 0.253*** 0.252*** 0.061*** 0.019 0.016 0.080*** -0.015 -0.023
(0.028) (0.031) (0.031) (0.021) (0.016) (0.015) (0.018) (0.025) (0.025)
Home* Fin. dep. 0.117 0.163* 0.162* 0.080 0.158*** 0.154*** 0.120 0.218*** 0.208***
(0.093) (0.083) (0.084) (0.069) (0.054) (0.049) (0.086) (0.084) (0.072)
Fin. dep. -0.066 -0.071 -0.059 0.285*** 0.322*** 0.329** 0.129 0.193* 0.245***
(0.059) (0.067) (0.073) (0.083) (0.108) (0.122) (0.098) (0.098) (0.089)
Firm-level controls yes yes yes yes yes yes
Local trends yes yes yes
Global trends yes yes yes
R2 0.022 0.034 0.034 0.035 0.075 0.082 0.022 0.115 0.124
N 4,915 4,915 4,915 4,915 4,915 4,915 4,915 4,915 4,915
Notes: *, **, *** significant at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level. Standard errors are clustered at four-digit NACE industries. All regressions
include a constant term. Regressions only include foreign firms whose foreign-owned shares exceed 50%. Financial dependence is the Rajan
and Zingales (1998) index. Global industry controls include capital intensity and TFP growth rates of the four-digit NACE industries in the
United States between 1998 and 2004. Local industry controls are capital intensity and RTFP average growth rates at the four-digit level in
Hungary in the late 90s. Firm-level controls are age, employment and RTFP in the initial year (1998). Source: APEH.
Table A.15: Export Platforms
∆ Capital Intensity ∆ Labor Productivity ∆ RTFP ∆ Leverage
90% 75% 90% 75% 90% 75% 90% 75%
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Home 0.214*** 0.212*** 0.036* 0.022 0.024* 0.018 0.140 0.102
(0.027) (0.029) (0.020) (0.021) (0.006) (0.011) (0.108) (0.113)
Home* Fin. dep. 0.174* 0.212** 0.081** 0.076* 0.025* 0.031* 0.481* 0.643**
(0.089) (0.101) (0.038) (0.044) (0.007) (0.009) (0.288) (0.300)
Fin. dep. -0.055 -0.090 0.380*** 0.380*** 0.266** 0.385* -0.583** -0.748***
(0.093) (0.105) (0.101) (0.095) (0.030) (0.107) (0.261) (0.274)
Firm-level controls yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Local trends yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Global trends yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
R2 0.030 0.030 0.085 0.083 0.105 0.134 0.008 0.008
N 4,789 4,667 4,789 4,667 4,789 4,667 2,311 2,249
Notes: *, **, *** significant at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level. Standard errors are clustered at four-digit NACE industries. All regressions include a constant
term. Columns 1, 3, 5 and 7 restrict the analysis to foreign firms that export shares lower than 90% of their total sales. Columns 2, 4, 6 and 8 restrict the
analysis to foreign firms that export shares lower than 75%. Global industry controls include capital intensity and TFP growth rates of the four-digit NACE
industries in the United States between 1998 and 2004. Local industry controls are capital intensity and RTFP average growth rates at the four-digit level
in Hungary in the late 90s. Firm-level controls are age, employment and RTFP in the initial year (1998). Source: APEH.
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Table A.16: Skill-Intensity
∆ Skill Intensity
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Home 0.003* 0.014** 0.013** -0.014**
(0.002) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Home.* Fin. dep. 0.041**
(0.016)
Financial dependence 0.021**
(0.009)
Firm-level control yes yes yes
Local trend yes yes
Global trends yes yes
R2 0.004 0.028 0.038 0.053
N 1,221 1,221 1,221 1,179
Notes: *, **, *** significant at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level. Standard errors are
clustered at four-digit NACE industries. All regressions include a constant term. Fi-
nancial dependence is the Rajan and Zingales (1998) index. Global industry controls
include capital intensity and TFP growth rates of the four-digit NACE industries in
the United States between 1998 and 2004. Local industry controls are capital inten-
sity and RTFP average growth rates at the four-digit level in Hungary in the late
90s. Firm-level controls are age, employment and RTFP in the initial year (1998).
Source: APEH.
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Table A.17: Falsification Test: Effect by Year
Log Leverage
(1)
1999*Home -0.137**
(0.055)
2000*Home -0.149**
(0.056)
2001*Home -0.121
(0.072)
2002*Home 0.012
(0.071)
2003*Home 0.039
(0.073)
2004*Home 0.143**
(0.059)
Year FE Yes
Sector FE Yes
Firm-level controls Yes
Global trends Yes
R2 0.830
N 16,452
F Tests on Equality of Coefficients
F-stat 1999-00 0.05
pvalue 0.8220
F-stat 2000-02 6.05
pvalue 0.0231
F-stat 2000-03 5.60
pvalue 0.0281
F-stat 2000-04 12.71
pvalue 0.0019
Notes: *, **, *** significant at the 10, 5, and 1 per-
cent level. Standard errors are clustered at year and
four-digit NACE industries. Global industry controls
include capital intensity and TFP of the four-digit
NACE industries in the United States between 1998
and 2004. Firm-level controls are employment, labor
productivity and age in the initial year (1998). All
regressions include four-digit industries fixed-effects.
Source: APEH.
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Table A.18: Falsification Test: Effect by Year
Log Markup
(1)
1998*Foreign 0.096***
(0.023)
1999*Foreign 0.112***
(0.021)
2000*Foreign 0.099***
(0.021)
2001*Foreign 0.078***
(0.022)
2002*Foreign 0.078***
(0.021)
2003*Foreign 0.062***
(0.020)
2004*Foreign 0.051**
(0.024)
Year FE Yes
Sector FE Yes
Firm-level controls Yes
Global trends Yes
R2 0.190
N 37,632
F Tests on Equality of Coefficients
F-stat 1998-00 0.08
pvalue 0.7870
F-stat 2000-02 3.49
pvalue 0.0766
F-stat 2000-03 12.62
pvalue 0.0020
F-stat 2000-04 9.10
pvalue 0.0068
Notes: *, **, *** significant at the 10, 5, and 1 per-
cent level. Standard errors are clustered at year and
four-digit NACE industries. Global industry controls
include capital intensity and TFP of the four-digit
NACE industries in the United States between 1998
and 2004. Firm-level controls are employment, labor
productivity and age in the initial year (1998). All
regressions include four-digit industries fixed-effects.
Source: APEH.
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Table A.19: Markups: Falsification Test, Year 1998
∆ Markups
(1) (2) (3)
Foreign -0.003 -0.007 -0.006
(0.012) (0.014) (0.014)
Firm controls yes yes
Local trends yes
Global trends yes
R2 0.000 0.024 0.028
N 3,953 3,953 3,953
Notes: *, **, *** significant at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level. Stan-
dard errors are clustered at four-digit NACE industries. All regressions
include a constant term. Global industry controls include capital in-
tensity and TFP growth rates of the four-digit NACE industries in the
United States between 1996 and 2000. Local industry controls are cap-
ital intensity and RTFP average growth rates at the four-digit level in
Hungary in the early 90s. Firm-level controls are age, employment and
RTFP in the initial year (1996). Source: APEH.
Table A.20: Markups: Controlling for Subsidies and Exceptions
∆ Markups
(1) (2)
Foreign -0.027** 0.028*
(0.011) (0.015)
Foreign * Fin. dep. -0.202***
(0.044)
Fin. dep. 0.212***
(0.070)
Subsidy and tax ex. -0.202 -0.246
(0.150) (0.154)
(Previous) Firm controls yes yes
Local trends yes yes
Global trends yes yes
R2 0.024 0.058
N 5,376 5,086
Notes: *, **, *** significant at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level. Standard errors are clustered at four-digit NACE
industries. All regressions include a constant term. Global industry controls include capital intensity and TFP
growth rates of the four-digit NACE industries in the United States between 1998 and 2004. Local industry
controls are capital intensity and RTFP average growth rates at the four-digit level in Hungary in the late 90s.
Firm-level controls are subsidies and tax exceptions, age, employment and RTFP in the initial year (1998). Source:
APEH.
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Table A.21: Markups: Including all Firms
∆ Markups
(1) (2)
Foreign -0.026* -0.001
(0.012) (0.016)
Foreign*Fin. dep. -0.106**
(0.047)
Fin. dep. 0.165**
(0.062)
Firm-level controls yes yes
Local trends yes yes
Global trends yes yes
R2 0.028 0.034
N 7,039 6,921
Notes: *, **, *** significant at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level. Standard errors are clustered at four-digit NACE
industries. All regressions include a constant term. Global industry controls include capital intensity and TFP
growth rates of the four-digit NACE industries in the United States between 1998 and 2004. Local industry
controls are capital intensity and RTFP average growth rates at the four-digit level in Hungary in the late 90s.
Firm-level controls are age, employment and RTFP in the initial year (1998). Source: APEH.
Table A.22: Markups: PCM, WLP and DLTL Methodologies
∆ Markups
PCM WLP DLTL
(1) (2) (3)
Foreign -0.044 -0.032** -0.013
(0.041) (0.013) (0.028)
Foreign*Fin. dep. -0.333*** -0.086** -0.186**
(0.112) (0.036) (0.073)
Financial dependence 0.236** 0.087* 0.003
(0.100) (0.043) (0.073)
Firm-level controls yes yes yes
Local trends yes yes yes
Global trends yes yes yes
R2 0.008 0.036 0.023
N 4,811 4,646 4,621
Notes: *, **, *** significant at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level. Standard errors are clustered at four-digit NACE
industries. All regressions include a constant term. Global industry controls include capital intensity and TFP
growth rates of the four-digit NACE industries in the United States between 1998 and 2004. Local industry
controls are capital intensity and RTFP average growth rates at the four-digit level in Hungary in the late 90s.
Firm-level controls are age, employment and RTFP in the initial year (1998). Source: APEH.
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Table A.23: Markups: Controlling for Export Platforms
∆ Markups
90% 75% 90% 75%
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Foreign -0.026** 0.015 -0.022* 0.017
(0.010) (0.014) (0.011) (0.011)
Foreign * Fin. dep. -0.152*** -0.136***
(0.038) (0.040)
Fin. dep. 0.218*** 0.218***
(0.071) (0.071)
Firm-level controls yes yes yes yes
Local trends yes yes yes yes
Global trends yes yes yes yes
R2 0.021 0.061 0.041 0.063
N 4,841 4,737 4,720 4,616
Notes: *, **, *** significant at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level. Standard errors are clustered at four-digit NACE industries. All
regressions include a constant term. Columns 1 and 3 restrict the analysis to foreign firms that export shares lower than 90%
of their total sales. Columns 2 and 4 restrict the analysis to foreign firms that export shares lower than 75%. Global industry
controls include capital intensity and TFP growth rates of the four-digit NACE industries in the United States between 1998
and 2004. Local industry controls are capital intensity and RTFP average growth rates at the four-digit level in Hungary in the
late 90s. Firm-level controls are age, employment and RTFP in the initial year (1998). Source: APEH.
Table A.24: Acceleration of RTFP Growth
Cumulative RTFP Growth
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Time trend 17.586*** 13.884*** 13.523*** 14.468*** 13.845*** 13.625***
(0.630) (0.537) (0.601) (3.319) (1.019) (0.574)
Structural break in slope 8.992*** 8.407*** 9.115*** 8.897*** 11.083***
(financial liberalization, 2001) (1.120) (1.194) (1.351) (2.368) (2.100)
Structural break in level 7.015
(financial liberalization, 2001) (5.620)
Structural break in slope -0.673
(trade liberalization, 1996) (3.769)
Structural break in slope 0.116
(falsification test, 1998) (2.527)
Structural break in slope -3.513
(falsification test, 2004) (2.999)
R2 0.981 0.997 0.997 0.997 0.997 0.997
N 17 17 17 17 17 17
Notes: All regressions include a constant term. *,**, *** significant at the 10, 5, 1 percent level. Source: APEH.
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Appendix B Model: Additional Derivations and Extensions
B.1. Additional Derivations
(i) Firms’ Markups and Profits. In the first period, firms make two types of decisions. First, they
decide their optimal innovation efforts. Next, after learning the result of the innovation process,
they decide whether to produce in the second period. I solve firms’ optimal innovation efforts by
backward induction. That is, I first compute firms’ production profits and then compute their
optimal innovation efforts.
In this Bertrand competition setting, only the firm with the lowest marginal cost in each in-
termediate variety will be active in equilibrium. Given the production function and the market
structure, the active firm minimizes its total production cost:
Minlsjt+1,ksjt+1 TCsjt+1 = wt+1lsjt+1 +R
s′
t+1ksjt+1
st ysjt+1 ≥ qsjt+1 k
α
sjt+1l
1−α
sjt+1,
where Rs
′
is either the domestic lending rate for home firms (RL) or the international rate (R∗)
otherwise. In variety j, the active firm’s marginal cost becomes
MCsjt+1 =
1
qsjt+1
(
Rs
′
t+1
α
)α( wt+1
1− α
)1−α
. (18)
Equation (18) indicates that the active firm’s marginal cost depends on its productivity level and,
notably, on its financing costs. The higher is the interest rate, the higher is its marginal cost. Given
the optimal demand for variety j, yjt+1 =
Yt+1
pjt+1
, the active firm’s profit from production activities
is Πpjt+1 = (pjt+1 −MCjt+1) yjt+1 = (1− ξ
−1
jt+1)Yt+1, where ξjt+1 is the firm’s markup. I next turn
to show how foreign and domestic firms’ markups and profits are determined in equilibrium.
→ Foreign firms. If the foreign firm in variety j succeeds in improving the existing technology
and is the market leader in equilibrium, its markup will be
ξpostFjt+1 ≡
pjt+1
MCpostFjt+1
=
MCpreHjt+1
MCpostFjt+1
=
(
RLt+1
R∗t+1
)α qpostFjt+1
qpreHjt+1
= τt+1 λ
∆j+1, (19)
where MCpostFjt+1 is the foreign firm’s marginal cost if the innovation succeeds, and MC
pre
Hjt+1 is the
home firm’s marginal cost in the absence of innovation. Recall that under Bertrand competition,
the leader sets its price equal to the marginal cost of the closest competitor. In this case, the foreign
firm sets its price equal to the marginal cost of the home firm in that variety. Notice that, after
minimizing production costs, firms’ marginal costs are given by MCpostFjt+1 =
(
R∗
t+1
α
)α(
wt+1
1−α
)1−α
qpost
Fjt+1
and
MCpreHjt+1 =
(
RL
t+1
α
)α(
wt+1
1−α
)1−α
qpre
Hjt+1
.
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If the foreign firm does not succeed in improving the existing technology and keeps its initial
productivity level, its markup will be
ξpreFjt+1 ≡
pjt+1
MCpreFjt+1
=
MCpreHjt+1
MCpreFjt+1
=
(
RLt+1
R∗t+1
)α qpreFjt+1
qpreHjt+1
= τt+1 λ
∆j . (20)
Given equations (19) and (20), the foreign firm’s post- and pre-innovation profits are
ΠpostFjt+1 = (1−
1
τt+1 λ∆j+1
)Yt+1 and Π
pre
Fjt+1 = (1−
1
τt+1 λ∆j
)Yt+1. (21)
Equations (19)-(21) show that if foreign firms are active in equilibrium, their markups and profits
are distorted by τt+1 = R
L
t+1/R
∗
t+1, namely the differential access to capital markets.
→ Home firms. If the home firm in variety j succeeds in improving the existing technology and
becomes the market leader, its markup will be
ξpostHjt+1 ≡
pjt+1
MCpostHjt+1
=
MCpreFjt+1
MCpostHjt+1
=
(
R∗t+1
RLt+1
)α qpostHjt+1
qpreFjt+1
=
λ
τt+1
. (22)
Otherwise, it will still have a higher marginal cost than a foreign firm and remain out of the market.
The home firm’s post-innovation profit will be
ΠpostHjt+1 = (1−
τt+1
λ
)Yt+1. (23)
As for foreign firms, equations (22) and (23) show that home firms’ markups and profits are dis-
torted by asymmetric access to international capital markets. Notice that, in equations (19)-(23),
the technology gap between foreign and home firms is the only variety-specific payoff-relevant
variable. To simplify notation, I drop the dependence on variety j and denote each variety as
a function of the productivity gap. Note that the revenue TFP of the active producer becomes
RTFPs∆t+1 = [(
wt+1
1−α )
1−α(
Rs
′
t+1
α )
α]ξs∆t+1.
(ii) Firms’ Innovation Efforts. Firms choose their optimal innovation efforts, xF∆t and xH∆t, so
as to maximize their expected profits net of the innovation costs. Given the research technology,
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the optimization programs of foreign and home firms are34
MaxxF∆t xF∆tΠ
post
F∆t+1 + (1− xF∆t − xH∆t)Π
pre
F∆t+1 −R
∗
t+1[wt Γ(xF∆t,∆)] (24)
and MaxxH∆t xH∆tΠ
post
H∆t+1 −R
L
t+1[wt Γ(xH∆t)].
Firms’ optimal innovation efforts become
xFt =
φ
τt+1
(1− λ−1)
wt
Yt+1
R∗t+1
and xHt =
φ
τ
1/α
t+1
(1− τt+1 λ
−1)
wt
Yt+1
R∗t+1
.
As discussed above, both firms’ optimal innovation intensities are distorted by the asymmetric
access to international capital markets. Furthermore, firms’ innovation intensities are constant
across varieties and only differ in their borrowing costs (τ); hence, if firms enjoyed similar access
to capital markets, their innovation efforts would be equal.
(iii) Aggregate Productivity Growth. Aggregate productivity growth is given by
gQt+1 = log (λ) (xFt + xHt).
To see this, note that the aggregate productivity level is log(Qt+1) =
∫ 1
0 log(qjt+1)dj. In each
intermediate variety, productivity increases originate from two sources: either the domestic firm
innovates with probability xHt or the foreign firm innovates with probability xFt. In both cases,
productivity increases by a factor log(λ). Therefore, the increase in productivity in each variety is
xHt log(λ) + xFt log(λ). Under the law of large numbers, a continuum of varieties of measure one
ensures that the change in aggregate productivity is given by (xHt + xFt) log(λ) and that its level
in t+ 1 is log(Qt+1) = (xHt + xFt) log(λ) + log(Qt). As a result, aggregate productivity growth is
given by
gQt+1 = log(Qt+1)− log(Qt) = log(λ)(xHt + xFt).
(iv) Labor Market Clearing. After minimizing its total costs, the optimal labor demand of the
active firm producing in variety ∆ is l∆t+1 = (1 − α)
Yt+1
wt+1
1
ξend
∆t+1
, where end denotes the obtained
markups, which can be either post if the firm succeeded in innovating or pre otherwise. Aggregat-
ing across varieties, the total labor demand for production activities is Lpt+1 = (1 − α)
Yt+1
wt+1
Λt+1,
where Λt+1 =
∫
ξ−1 end∆t+1 d∆ < 1 as in Peters (2013). Note that the labor demand is reduced by the
34For simplicity, I assume that firms borrow from banks once they learn about the result of the innovation process,
and hence there is no uncertainty in the debt contract. This assumption allows us to focus on firms’ pure incentives
to innovate and separate these decisions from optimal debt contracts. As is standard in innovation models, it implies
that workers are able to insure against innovation risk. For example, this could be implemented through a mutual
fund consisting of a continuum of risk-neutral workers. After being paid, workers deposit their wage payments in the
fund and divide them equally between themselves (as in Acemoglu 2009; Aghion and Howitt 1992; Peters 2013).
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presence of markups, as active firms set higher prices, produce less, and, hence, demand less labor.
Labor market clearing implies Lt+1 ≡ 1 = L
p
t+1 + L
I
t+1, where L
I represents the labor employed
in innovation activities by the new firms in t + 1, and LIt+1 =
∫
Γ(xst)d∆. This determines the
equilibrium wage in the economy.
(v) Capital Market Clearing. After minimizing its costs, the optimal capital demand of the active
firm producing in variety ∆ is ks∆t+1 =
α
Rs
′
t+1
Yt+1
ξend
∆t+1
, where Rs
′
t+1 is either the domestic lending rate
if a home firm is active in equilibrium or the international rate otherwise. Aggregating across
varieties, the total capital demands of home and foreign firms are
KHt+1 =
α
RLt+1
Yt+1Λ
H
t+1 and K
F
t+1 =
α
R∗t+1
Yt+1Λ
F
t+1, (25)
where ΛHt+1 =
∫
ξ−1Ht+1dH < 1 and Λ
F
t+1 =
∫
ξ−1F∆t+1dF < 1 and denote the distribution of markups
of active domestic and foreign firms. Similarly to labor demands, firms’ optimal capital demands
are reduced by markups, as they reduce the optimal scale of production. Foreign firms invest cap-
ital until the return of their investment is equal to the international interest rate. As there are no
financial flows in or out of the economy, home firms’ total investment equals the local savings of
young workers.
(vi) Budget Constraint in the Closed Economy. The economy’s budget constraint is given by
Ct+1 + I
H
t+1 + I
F
t+1 = wt+1L
p
t+1 +Π
H
t+1 +Π
F
t+1 +R
D
t+1K
H
t+1 +R
∗
t+1K
F
t+1,
where investment (Ist+1) includes investment in the capital and technology of active firms. Aggregate
consumption and investment equal the wages of workers employed by domestic and foreign firms,
net profits of active domestic and foreign firms, and payments to home and foreign capital.35 The
balance of payments implies that the current account (CA) and capital account (KA) sum to zero
and, in particular, that foreign firms’ net profits and capital repayment (capital outflows) equal
their investment (capital inflows):
CAt+1 −KAt+1 = 0 ⇔ −[Π
F
t+1 +R
∗
t+1K
F
t+1] + I
F
t+1 = 0.
(vii) Budget Constraint and Equilibrium in the Open Economy. Since in the open economy,
local investment is no longer constrained by the availability of domestic savings, the expansion of
home firms leads to capital inflows. The economy’s budget constraint becomes
C(t+1)+ Iˆ
H
(t+1)+ Iˆ
F
(t+1) = w(t+1)L
p
(t+1)+Π
H
(t+1)+Π
F
(t+1)+T(t+1)+(R
∗
(t+1)+ τˆ)Kˆ
H
(t+1)+R
∗
(t+1)Kˆ
F
(t+1),
35Since the economy is shut down to international financial flows, lump-sum transfers to domestic households are
zero.
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where consumption and investment equal the payments of workers employed in production activ-
ities, home and foreign firms’ net profits, lump-sum transfers and payments to home and foreign
capital. The balance of payments is now defined as
CA(t+1) −KA(t+1) = 0 ⇔ −[Π
F
(t+1) +R
∗
(t+1)(Kˆ
F
(t+1) + Kˆ
H∗
(t+1))] + (Iˆ
F
(t+1) + Iˆ
H∗
(t+1)) = 0,
where KˆH∗(t+1) and Iˆ
H∗
(t+1) denote home investment financed with international funds. The current
account deficit expands as the increase in aggregate investment exceeds the expansion of local
savings.
In the open economy equilibrium, banks earn zero profits at RˆLt+1 and Rˆ
D
t+1; firms’ innovation
intensities are given by (4); active firms in each variety set the price equal to the marginal cost of
the closest competitor; labor and capital markets clear; aggregate output is given by Yt+1; aggre-
gate consumption is the sum of old workers’ consumption; the economy growth rate is gY t+1; and
the balance of payments is determined by −[ΠFt+1+R
∗
t+1(Kˆ
F
t+1+ Kˆ
H∗
t+1)] + (Iˆ
F
t+1+ Iˆ
H∗
t+1) = 0, where
KˆH∗t+1 and Iˆ
H∗
t+1 denote home investment financed with international funds. The increase in capital
inflows induces a deterioration in the current account.
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B.2. Banks and the Direction of Capital Flows
This section discusses banks’ optimal lending and financing choices in an economy subject to capital
controls. Consider that capital controls are such that only local banks are allowed to intermediate
foreign funds, but they incur a cost. As in Farhi and Werning (2012), capital controls take the
form of a per unit tax. In particular, banks have to pay a tax τ˜ per unit of foreign borrowing or
lending, which is then redistributed lump-sum to local households. In this economy, banks have
two financing choices and two lending choices: they can use either local or foreign savings to finance
their activities, and they can lend to either local or foreign agents. Importantly, the level of capital
controls determines banks’ intermediation choices and, with them, whether the economy is open or
closed to financial flows and its level of international financial integration.
More precisely, to finance their activities, banks can either borrow from domestic agents and
pay the deposit rate RDt+1 or borrow foreign savings and pay the international interest rate plus
the per unit tax, i.e. R∗t+1 + τ˜ . Similarly, banks enjoy two lending choices: they can either lend to
home firms at the rate RLt+1 or pay the tax on foreign transactions and lend abroad for a net return
of R∗t+1 − τ˜ . In this way, banks’ international financial transactions depend on how the domestic
deposit and lending interest rates compare with the foreign rate and the tax.
In this economy, two thresholds determine whether banks find it profitable to intermediate
foreign funds. One threshold defines banks’ financing choices, and a second threshold determines
banks’ lending choices. The first threshold is given by the comparison between RDt+1 and R
∗
t+1+ τ˜ ,
which establishes whether the domestic deposit interest rate is higher or lower than the foreign
rate plus the tax. If the domestic deposit rate is higher than the international rate plus the tax
on foreign transactions, banks’ financing costs are cheaper abroad than in the local economy and,
hence, they prefer to finance their activities using foreign savings. Importantly, as the return from
lending abroad is lower than the local lending rate, RLt+1 − µ > R
∗
t+1 + τ˜ , banks do not lend
abroad and focus their lending activities in the local market. Therefore, banks use foreign savings
to finance their local activities. In this case, financial liberalization leads banks to import foreign
funds until the local deposit rate is equal to the foreign interest rate plus the tax, and they become
indifferent between using local or foreign savings. This is the equilibrium in which the economy
receives capital inflows.
The second threshold is given by RLt+1 − µ < R
∗
t+1 − τ˜ , which defines that the local net lending
rate is lower than the return that banks would obtain from lending abroad. In this case, banks
would prefer to lend to foreign agents, as the return from lending locally is lower than what they
would obtain if they lend abroad. It is worth remarking that banks finance themselves using local
savings only because the local deposit rate is lower than the cost of using foreign savings, i.e.
RDt+1 < R
∗
t+1 + τ˜ . As such, financial liberalization leads banks to finance themselves locally and
use home savings to lend to foreign agents. Since banks use local savings to lend internationally,
there are capital outflows from the economy. The lesser amount of savings available for domestic
firms increases the domestic lending rate until it is equal to the international rate minus the tax,
and banks become indifferent between lending locally or abroad. This is the equilibrium in which
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the economy experiences capital outflows.
Importantly, if the tax rate is high enough, banks’ optimal choice is to collect local savings
to lend to home firms. In particular, for a sufficiently large τ˜ , RLt+1 > R
∗
t+1 − τ˜ , and banks only
lend to local agents, and RDt+1 − µ < R
∗
t+1 + τ˜ such that banks only finance their lending activities
using local deposits. As such, banks’ lending and financing activities remain local whenever the
equilibrium domestic deposit rate falls between R∗t+1 − τ˜ − µ < R
D
t+1 < R
∗
t+1 + τ˜ .
These two thresholds determine three regimes under which the economy could function: 1) if
RDt+1 > R
∗
t+1 + τ˜ , the economy receives capital inflows; 2) if R
L
t+1 − µ < R
∗
t+1 − τ˜ , the economy
experiences capital outflows; and 3) if R∗t+1 − τ˜ < R
D
t+1 < R
∗
t+1 + τ˜ , the economy is closed to
international financial flows. These three regimes are presented in the following table.
Capital Controls and International Capital Flows
Condition on RD Banks’ Optimal Behavior International Capital Flows
RDt+1 > R
∗
t+1 + τ˜ Use foreign savings to lend locally Capital inflows
RDt+1 < R
∗
t+1 − τ˜ Use local savings to lend abroad Capital outflows
R∗t+1 − τ˜ < R
D
t+1 < R
∗
t+1 + τ˜ Use local savings to lend locally Closed economy
I formally derive banks’ optimal choices below and show that only these three equilibria are
possible in this framework.
Banks’ Optimal Financing and Lending Choices
To formally study banks’ optimal lending and financing decisions, recall that banks operate in a
perfectly competitive sector and, hence, choose their optimal level of lending and deposits from
local and international markets. Banks’ optimization program is as follows:
Max{LH
t+1
,DH
t+1
,L∗
t+1
,D∗
t+1
} R
L
t+1L
H
t+1 + (R
∗
t+1 − τ˜)L
∗
t+1 −R
D
t+1D
H
t+1 − (R
∗
t+1 + τ˜)D
∗
t+1 − µL
H
t+1 − µL
∗
t+1
st LHt+1 + L
∗
t+1 = D
H
t+1 +D
∗
t+1, (26)
L∗t+1 ≥ 0, (27)
D∗t+1 ≥ 0, (28)
LHt+1 > 0, D
H
t+1 > 0, (29)
where LHt+1, D
H
t+1, L
∗
t+1, D
∗
t+1 represent the lending and deposits in the local and foreign markets,
respectively. Using equation (27), banks’ optimal maximization program becomes
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L = RLt+1L
H
t+1 + (R
∗
t+1 − τ˜)(D
H
t+1 +D
∗
t+1 − L
H
t+1)−R
D
t+1D
H
t+1 − (R
∗
t+1 + τ˜)D
∗
t+1−
µLHt+1 − µL
∗
t+1 − λ1(L
H
t+1 −D
H
t+1 −D
∗
t+1)− λ2(−D
∗
t+1).
Case 1: Closed-Economy Equilibrium
If λ1 > 0 and λ2 > 0, equations (27) and (28) bind. The first order conditions for banks’ optimal
level of domestic lending and deposits imply that the domestic lending rate is equal to the domestic
deposit rate plus the intermediation costs:
RLt+1 = R
D
t+1 + µ,
and that the total level lending equals total deposits in the domestic market:
LHt+1 = D
H
t+1.
This is a closed-economy equilibrium, with no international financial flows, as discussed in Sections
2.1-2.3.
Case 2: Capital Inflows Equilibrium
If λ1 > 0 and λ2 = 0, then L
∗
t+1 = 0 and D
∗
t+1 > 0. The first order conditions for L
H , DH , and D∗
imply that
LHt+1 = D
H
t+1 +D
∗
t+1,
which shows that banks employ both domestic and foreign savings to finance their local lending
activities. The domestic lending and deposit rates are given by
RDt+1 = R
∗
t+1 + τ˜ and R
L
t+1 = R
∗
t+1 + τ˜ + µ = R
D
t+1 + µ.
In this equilibrium, there are capital inflows into the economy.
Case 3: Capital Outflows Equilibrium
If λ1 > 0 and λ2 = 0, then L
∗
t+1 > 0 and D
∗
t+1 = 0. Banks’ optimal decisions on L
H , DH , and L∗
imply that
LHt+1 + L
∗
t+1 = D
H
t+1.
That is, banks only employ domestic deposits to finance their lending activities that are oriented
to both the local and foreign markets. In this equilibrium, the domestic and lending rates are given
by
RLt+1 = R
∗
t+1 − τ˜ + µ and R
D
t+1 = R
∗
t+1 − τ˜ .
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In this equilibrium, there are capital outflows out of the economy.
Case 4: No Equilibrium
Notice that if λ1 = 0 and λ2 = 0 (i.e. L
∗
t+1 > 0 and D
∗
t+1 > 0), an equilibrium does not exist, as
neither τ˜ nor µ can take negative values in this framework.
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B.3. Financial Liberalization: Comparative Statics
Proposition 1. ∂xFt∂τt+1 < 0 and
∂xHt
∂τt+1
< 0. This can be directly seen from equation (4). Furthermore,
| ∂xFt∂τt+1 | <|
∂xHt
∂τt+1
|.
Proposition 2. Active domestic firms’ leverage (d/ypostHt+1 = wt
Γ(xHt)
yHt+1
+
kHt+1
yHt+1
) is given by36


(d/y)postH∆t+1 with probability xHt,
0 otherwise.
Under the law of large numbers, a continuum of varieties guarantees that a domestic firm’s leverage
equals its expected value, i.e.
(d/y)eH∆t+1 = (d/y)
post
H∆t+1xHt.
Then,
∂(d/y)e
H∆t+1
∂τt+1
< 0.
Proposition 3. As equation (2) shows, foreign firms’ markups originate from two sources: the
technology gap between their local competitors and the difference in financing terms. Both of them
decrease in τ . To see this, consider first how the reduction in distortions in international capital
markets affects the technology gap between foreign and home firms. Notice that the technology
gap between foreign and home firms within a variety will be


∆+ 1 with probability xFt,
−1 with probability xHt,
∆ with probability (1− xFt − xHt).
(30)
Under the law of large numbers, the expected technology gap between F and H firms ∆e becomes
∆et+1 = ∆+ xFt − (1 + ∆)xHt. (31)
As
∂∆et+1
∂τt+1
> 0, reductions in distortions in capital markets reduce the productivity gap between
foreign and home firms. Furthermore, a foreign firm’s markup will be


ξpostF∆t+1 with probability xFt,
0 with probability xHt,
ξpreF∆t+1 with probability (1− xFt − xHt).
(32)
36To simplify notation, I have dropped the dependence on variety j and denote each intermediate variety as a
function of the productivity gap, which is the only variety-specific payoff-relevant variable (see equation (2)).
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Under the law of large numbers, a continuum of varieties ensures that a foreign firm’s markup will
be equal to its expected value. More precisely,
ξeF∆t+1 = τt+1 λ
∆+1xFt + τt+1 λ
∆(1− xFt − xHt). (33)
Using equations (31) and (33), the change in foreign firms’ expected markups is
∂ξe
F∆t+1
∂τt+1
= λ∆
(
1 + xFt(λ− 1)− xHt
)(
1 + τt+1 ln(λ)
∂∆et+1
∂τt+1
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
+ τt+1λ
∆
(
(λ− 1)
∂xFt
∂τt+1
−
∂x(H,t)
∂τt+1
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
> 0.
Therefore, foreign firms’ markups decrease following the reduction in distortions in the access to
international capital markets.
Proposition 4. From equation (31), it can be directly seen that
∂∆et+1
∂τt+1∂∆
> 0.
Proposition 5. The sign of
∂gQt+1
∂τt+1
results directly from Proposition 1 and equation (5).
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B.4. Financial Liberalization: General Equilibrium
This section conducts a numerical experiment to illustrate the model’s qualitative implications of
Section 2.4.2 in a general equilibrium framework. Note that this exercise does not aim to quantify
the model, but rather to provide some insights about whether its qualitative predictions hold true
in general equilibrium.
-Numerical Illustration
In this exercise, I study the impact of a reduction in capital controls on firms’ innovation incentives,
competition, and aggregate productivity growth in general equilibrium when financial liberalization
leads to capital inflows. In the model, the level of capital controls is given by τˆ , which represents
the wedge between the domestic and international interest rate. In this experiment, I set its initial
level to 3%, which was the interest rate differential between domestic and foreign firms prior to the
reform (Table 1), and I let this parameter go to 0 as we move from the regulated to the liberalized
economy. I let the international interest rate R∗ be 5.15%, which was the level of a U.S. one-year
T-bill in 2000. To better visualize the results, I consider a small wedge in the level of financial
development of the country and let µ be 0.1% and keep it constant along the exercise. I let the
elasticity of capital be 1/3. Following the standard literature in innovation (Acemoglu, Aghion,
and Zilibotti 2006, and Acemoglu and Akcigit 2011, among others), I choose λ and the technology
parameter φ to match the aggregate productivity growth in Hungary prior to the reform (5.8%
per year, as shown in Table 12). I then let λ = 1.2 and φ = 0.3. The equilibrium employment
of R&D workers depends on the largest productivity gap between domestic and foreign firms, i.e.
parameter d. I use the analysis in Section 5.5 to recover this parameter from the data. In particular,
I compute the productivity gap as the RTFP gap between the median foreign and domestic firms
within three-digit sectors and find that the larger gap prior to the reform was 2.5, so I set d equal
to this value. The estimation of domestic firms’ leverage requires considering two initial values: the
level of aggregate TFP and the productivity level of the home firm. I take both values from the
data and estimate lnQinitial = 8.716 and ln qH = 1.19, where the latter is the mean RTFP of home
firms in Table 2. Finally, the estimation of foreign firms’ markups and the productivity gap within
sectors require setting the value of the initial productivity gap between foreign and home firms. I
estimate an initial productivity gap of one.
Figure B.4.1 shows that all the model’s qualitative implications hold in a general equilibrium
setting. The horizontal axis represents the level of capital controls, i.e. the parameter τˆ in the
model, which goes from -0.03 under capital controls to 0 in the liberalized economy. Figure B.4.1
illustrates that a reduction in capital controls raises all firms’ incentives to invest in technology.
In line with Proposition 1, this expansion is greater for home firms. As expected, domestic firms’
leverage also increases following the liberalization of capital flows (Proposition 2). Confirming
the presence of pro-competitive forces, the reduction in capital controls is also associated with a
decrease in foreign firms’ markups and with reductions in the productivity gap between foreign and
domestic firms (Propositions 3 and 4). The increase in aggregate productivity growth (Proposition
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5) is also valid in a general equilibrium setting. Additionally, I have included the evolution of the
current account, the deterioration of which is in line with the increase in capital inflows following
the financial liberalization.
For comparison, I include in Figure B.4.1 the results of the partial equilibrium analysis of Section
2.4, where wages and aggregate output are held constant. That is, I compare how a reduction in
capital controls affects firms’ investment in technology and competition when wages and aggregate
output are held constant or allowed to adjust. As expected, in general equilibrium, the expansion
in firms’ innovation efforts is relatively smaller because the increase in wages raises the innovation
costs (see Atkeson and Burstein 2010).
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B.5. Financial Liberalization: Capital Outflows
Consider a low level of financial development (high µ) such that the reduction in capital controls
makes the deposit interest rate lower than the foreign interest rate minus the new value of the tax
rate τˆ , RDt+1 < R
∗
t+1 − τˆ . In this case, banks prefer to lend to foreign agents because the domestic
lending rate is lower than what banks would perceive if they lend abroad:
RLt+1 − µ < R
∗
t+1 − τˆ . (34)
Furthermore, banks finance themselves by employing local savings only because the local deposit
rate is lower than the cost of employing foreign savings (RDt+1 < R
∗
t+1 + τˆ). Hence, under equation
(34), banks finance themselves locally and use domestic savings to lend to foreign agents. Since
banks use local savings to lend internationally, there are capital outflows from the economy. The
lesser amount of savings available for domestic firms increases the domestic lending rate until it
is equal to the international rate minus the tax and banks become indifferent between lending
locally or abroad. In the open economy equilibrium, the domestic deposit and lending rates are
exogenously determined by
RˆDt+1 = R
∗
t+1 − τˆ and Rˆ
L
t+1 = R
∗
t+1 − τˆ + µ. (35)
It is worth noting that whether or not the economy experiences capital outflows depends on how the
tax on foreign transactions compares with the local level of financial development (µ). In particular,
the local intermediation cost creates a wedge between the domestic lending rate and the return to
lend internationally. The larger is this wedge, the lower are banks’ returns from lending locally
and, hence, their incentives to intermediate funds domestically. Hence, as in Gertler and Rogoff
(1990), Mendoza, Quadrini, and Rios-Rull (2009), and Coeurdacier, Guibaud, and Jin (2015), a
low level of financial development can lead to capital outflows even in a capital-scarce economy.
Importantly, if the closed-economy lending rate satisfies equation (34), capital account liber-
alization leads to an increase in the costs of funds for domestic firms. Higher borrowing costs
raise their marginal cost, undermining their post-innovation profits and their incentives to invest
in technology. In turn, the lower competitive pressure in the product market reduces foreign firms’
incentives to invest in technology. As both home and foreign firms innovate less, aggregate produc-
tivity grows at a lower pace after the liberalization. Note as well that the increase in the domestic
lending rate reduces home firms’ capital demands and, thus, their leverage and investment. In turn,
the decline in aggregate investment leads to an improvement in the current account.
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B.6. Pro-Competitive Effects in Cournot Competition
This section analyses whether the pro-competitive effects implied in Bertrand competition follow-
ing financial liberalization are also valid in other oligopolistic frameworks. To analyze this, I build
a model in the spirit of Devereux and Lee (2001), Atkeson and Burstein (2008) and Edmond,
Midrigan, and Xu (2015), who study the effects of trade liberalization in Cournot competition. I
adapt these models to the case of financial liberalization and extend it to the case of endogenous
innovation and asymmetric access to international capital markets across firms. I show that, in
this setting, financial liberalization also turns on pro-competitive forces that lead all firms to invest
more in technology. Previously discriminated home firms invest more in technology because they
face better financing terms. Non-discriminated firms also invest more in technology because they
face deeper competition.
-Setup
This model follows the same timing as in the main text. In the first period, intermediate firms
make two types of decisions: first, they choose their optimal innovation efforts; next, after learning
the result of the innovation process, they decide whether to produce in the second period. To
produce in t + 1, firms need to invest in physical capital in t. As in the main text, firms finance
their expenditures in capital and technology with external funds and take the innovation efforts
of other agents and factor prices as given. To keep the analysis simple, and since the purpose of
this exercise is to illustrate the pro-competitive forces in a Cournot setting, I focus on a partial
equilibrium economy. I first describe the setup and later present the qualitative implications of the
model.
Final Good
There is a final good composed of a continuum of measure one of j intermediate varieties:
Yt+1 =
(∫ 1
0
y
θ−1
θ
jt+1dj
) θ
θ−1
, (36)
where θ > 1 is the elasticity of substitution across varieties j. The aggregate price index is Pt+1 =( ∫ 1
0 p
1−θ
jt+1dj
) 1
1−θ
. For simplicity, I allow each intermediate variety to be composed of two firms,
home and foreign, and the intermediate output to be given by
yjt+1 =
(
β y
γ−1
γ
Hjt+1 + (1− β) y
γ−1
γ
Fjt+1
) γ
γ−1
, (37)
where γ > θ is the elasticity of substitution across goods within a particular variety. The variety
price index is pjt+1 =
(
β p1−γHjt+1 + (1 − β) p
1−γ
Fjt+1
) 1
1−γ
. Given equations (36) and (37), the final
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good producer’s optimal demand functions are
yHjt+1 =
(
pHjt+1
pjt+1
)−γ(pjt+1
Pt+1
)−θ
Yt+1 and yFjt+1 =
(
pFjt+1
pjt+1
)−γ(pjt+1
Pt+1
)−θ
Yt+1. (38)
Intermediate Varieties
Capital Markets. Capital markets follow the same structure as in the main text. I assume that the
economy is subject to capital controls, such that only local banks can intermediate foreign funds.
However, banks have to pay a tax per unit of foreign borrowing or lending, i.e. τ˜ . This tax is then
rebated as a lump sum to the domestic household. The intermediate financial sector is perfectly
competitive, but incurs higher intermediation costs, µ, than the rest of the world. There is asym-
metric access to international capital markets across firms: whereas domestic firms can only borrow
from local banks at a rate RL, foreign firms have direct access to international funds and borrow
at R∗. I follow the exercise in Section 2.4.2, where the economy is capital scarce and experiences
capital inflows upon financial liberalization.
Production. Intermediate firm producers operate using a Cobb-Douglas production function ysj =
qsjk
α
sjl
1−α
sj , where s = {H,F}, q, k, l represent physical productivity, capital, and labor, and
α ∈ (0, 1). Capital fully depreciates upon production.
Competition. In each intermediate variety, firms engage in Cournot competition and choose quan-
tities (ysjt+1), taking as given the quantity decisions of their variety competitor.
Technology and Innovation. I let firms’ productivity evolve in a quality ladder, with increases mea-
sured by λ. Research technology implies that innovation is stochastic and depends on firms’ inno-
vation efforts. In particular, R&D technology is such that if a firm aims for an innovation intensity
of xsj , it has to hire Γ units of labor; in particular, Γsjt =
1
φ
x2sjt
2 .
-Firms’ Optimal Behavior
I solve firms’ optimal strategies by backward induction. Recall that new firms are heterogeneous
in their initial productivity level, but they innovate to get a frontier technology. After learning the
result of the innovation process, they decide whether to produce in the second period. Accordingly,
I first compute the profits that they would obtain if they produce in t+ 1 and then compute their
optimal innovation efforts in t.
Firms maximize profits by choosing their optimal quantities, given the outcome of the innovation
technology and taking as given the wage and the interest rate. In particular,
Maxysjt+1 (psjt+1 − csjt+1)ysjt+1
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st equation (38),
where csjt+1 represents the marginal cost of firm s.
37 The first order condition implies the following
optimal price:
psjt+1 =
εsjt+1
εsjt+1 − 1
csjt+1,
where εsjt+1 > 1 and represents the endogenous demand elasticity, given by
εsjt+1 =
(
1
θ
ωsjt+1 +
1
γ
[1− ωsjt+1]
)−1
, (39)
where ωsjt+1 =
psjt+1ysjt+1
pjt+1yjt+1
represents the market share of firm s in t+ 1.
In the first period, firms choose their optimal innovation efforts xsjt to maximize their expected
profits net of innovation costs. In particular,
Maxxsjt xsjtΠ
post
sjt+1 + (1− xFjt − xHjt)Π
pre
sjt+1 −R
s′
t+1[wt
1
φ
x2sjt
2
],
where Πpostsjt+1 denotes the end-of-period profits if firm s succeeds in innovating and climbing one
step ahead in the quality ladder, and Πpresjt+1 are the profits if innovation is unsuccessful and the
firm retains its initial productivity level. Therefore, home and foreign firms’ optimal innovation
efforts are
xHjt = φ
[ΠpostHjt+1 −Π
pre
Hjt+1]
wtRLt+1
and xFjt = φ
[ΠpostFjt+1 −Π
pre
Fjt+1]
wtR∗t+1
. (40)
Equation (40) shows that firms’ innovation efforts depend on the incremental benefit from innovat-
ing (i.e. the difference between their pre- and post- innovation profits) relative to their innovation
costs.
-Numerical Exploration
To see whether the pro-competitive forces implied by the Bertrand setting are also present under
Cournot competition, I conduct a numerical exploration. This exercise does not aim toward quan-
tifying the model, but rather to check whether the direction of the results is the same as in the
paper. More precisely, I want to check whether the decrease in capital controls leads home firms to
invest more in technology and whether the deeper competition encourages foreign firms to innovate
more as well.
To study how firms’ innovation incentives change when passing from an economy with capital
controls to a fully liberalized economy, I first need to set an initial level of capital controls. In the
model, this is represented by τ˜ , which denotes the wedge between the domestic and the foreign
37In particular, csjt+1 =
(
Rs
′
t+1
α
)α(
wt+1
1−α
)1−α
1
qsjt+1
, where Rs
′
would be the domestic lending rate RL for home
firms and R∗ the international rate for foreign firms.
79
interest rates. I set its initial level to 3%, which was the interest rate differential between domestic
and foreign firms prior to the reform (Table 1), and I let this parameter go to 0 as we move from the
regulated to the liberalized economy. I let the international interest rate R∗ be 5.15%, which was
the level of a U.S. one-year T-bill in 2000. To better visualize the results, I consider a small wedge in
the level of financial development in the country, and let µ be 0.1% and keep it constant throughout
the exercise. I set α = 1/3. For simplicity, I assume that home and foreign firms have equal initial
productivity, which I normalize to one. Following the literature in innovation (Acemoglu, Aghion,
and Zilibotti 2006; Acemoglu and Akcigit 2011; among others), I set the technology parameters to
λ = 1.2 and φ = 0.3, which are the values used in Appendix B.4 and which match the aggregate
productivity growth in Hungary prior to the reform (5.8% per year). Results remain unaffected if
these parameters change, for example, to λ = 1.05, λ = 1.35, φ = 1, or φ = 5. As in Devereux
and Lee (2001), Atkeson and Burstein (2008) or Edmond, Midrigan, and Xu (2015), I choose the
parameters of the within-variety and across-variety elasticities of substitution such that γ > θ, i.e.
the within-variety effects dominate the across-variety effects, and the firm’s demand elasticity is
lower the greater is its share of the variety output. As in Atkeson and Burstein (2008), I choose θ
close to one (θ = 1.01) to keep the expenditure of the composite good in each variety roughly stable.
It is difficult to choose a parameter for γ, the within-variety elasticity of substitution between home
and foreign firms’ products. I follow Atkeson and Burstein (2008) and choose a benchmark γ = 10,
which implies a high elasticity of substitution between these goods. I next check the sensitivity of
the analysis for γ = 5 and γ = 20. Finally, I consider a value for β = 0.5.
Figure B.6.1 displays the results. The horizontal axis represents the level of capital controls
(τ˜), which goes from -0.03 under capital controls to 0 in the fully liberalized economy. It shows
that a reduction in capital controls fosters all firms’ innovation efforts. As in the Bertrand setting,
the innovation efforts of home firms increase relatively more than foreign firms. To provide further
evidence about the two forces driving the results, I also plot the evolution of home firms’ leverage
and foreign firms’ markups. As expected, the reduction in financing terms leads home firms to
increase their leverage and competitive pressure. This deeper competition raises foreign firms’
endogenous demand elasticity and reduces their markups accordingly.
Figure B.6.2 plots the sensitivity analysis for γ = 5 and γ = 20. When γ = 5 and the elasticity
of substitution between home and foreign firms’ products is low, asymmetric access to interna-
tional capital markets still has a large impact on firms’ innovation efforts. However, when γ = 20
and competition between home and foreign firms’ products is very intense, capital controls create a
small distortion in firms’ innovation intensities. The intuition for this result is that when the degree
of product substitutability is very high, firms’ profits and innovation efforts are low and, hence, the
distortion caused by the asymmetric access to capital markets is low. In this way, capital market
distortions affect firms’ innovation efforts when firms enjoy some degree of market power over their
products.
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Figure B.6.1: Pro-Competitive Effects of Financial Liberalization under Cournot
Competition
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Figure B.6.2: Pro-Competitive Effects of Financial Liberalization under Cournot
Competition (Sensitivity Analysis)
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B.7. Firms’ Innovation Costs
In the model, I have assumed that more productive firms enjoy lower innovation costs. In particular,
I have let the innovation costs of foreign firms be easier when their technological advantage is greater.
In this section, I remove this assumption and show that the model’s predictions remain true when
home and foreign firms have equal innovation costs. Let firms’ innovation costs be determined by
Γ(xFjt) =
1
φ
x2Fjt
2
and Γ(xHjt) =
1
φ
x2Hjt
2
.
Home and foreign firms’ optimal innovation intensities are
xF∆t =
φ
τt+1λ∆
(1− λ−1)
wt
Yt+1
R∗t+1
and xHt =
φ
τ
1/α
t+1
(1− τt+1 λ
−1)
Yt+1
R∗t+1
, (41)
where foreign firms’ innovation efforts now depend on the technology gap between the foreign firms
and their local competitors. Notice that the greater is the initial technology gap, the lower are
foreign firms’ innovation efforts.
Proposition 1: Innovation intensities. A reduction in the asymmetric access to international capital
markets (τ) encourages all firms to increase their innovation intensities. Notably, the innovation
efforts of home firms increase relatively more.
From equation (41), it is straightforward to see that ∂xF∆t∂τt+1 < 0 and
∂xHt
∂τt+1
< 0. In addition,
|∂xF∆t∂τt+1 | <|
∂xHt
∂τt+1
|. Note that the greater is the technology gap between foreign and home firms, the
lower is foreign firms’ increase in innovation.
Proposition 2: Leverage. A reduction in τ increases home firms’ leverage.
That is,
∂(d/y)e
H∆t+1
∂τt+1
< 0, where (d/y)eH∆t+1.
Proposition 3: Markups. A decrease in τ leads to reductions in foreign firms’ markups.
The proof is similar to that in the main text. Under the law of large numbers, a continuum of
varieties ensures that a foreign firm’s markup will be equal to its expected value. More precisely,
ξeF∆t+1 = τt+1 λ
∆+1xF∆t + τt+1 λ
∆(1− xF∆t + xHt),
and
∂ξe
F∆t+1
∂τt+1
> 0.
Proposition 4: Productivity gap. Reductions in τ decrease the productivity gap between home and
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foreign firms. In particular, this drop is greater in sectors where foreign firms were technologically
far ahead of their local competitors.
From Proposition 1, as home firms invest more in technology, the technology gap between the
home firms and their foreign competitors narrows, i.e.
∂∆et+1
∂τt+1
> 0. Furthermore, this decrease is
larger, the greater is the initial gap between the home firms and their foreign rivals
∂∆et+1
∂τt+1∂∆
> 0.
Proposition 5: Aggregate productivity growth. A decrease in the asymmetric access to international
borrowing (τ) increases aggregate productivity growth.
Aggregate productivity growth is given by
gQt+1 = log(λ)
∞∑
i=1
µit+1(xHt + xF∆t) = log(λ)(µ1t+1xHt +
∞∑
i=1
µit+1 xF∆t).
Since foreign firms’ innovation efforts now depend on the initial technology gap between the foreign
firms and their local competitors (equation (41)), aggregate productivity growth depends on the
distribution of technology gaps in the economy, i.e.
∑
∞
i=1 µit+1. It can be shown that
∂gQt+1
∂τt+1
< 0,
i.e. the decrease in the distortion in the access to international capital markets raises aggregate
productivity growth. What is new here is that the increase in aggregate productivity growth
originates from two sources. First, similar to the main text, as both home and foreign firms invest
more in technology (Proposition 1), productivity increases. Second, the decrease in the dispersion of
the distribution of productivity gaps raises aggregate productivity growth. More precisely, as home
firms undertake greater innovation efforts than their foreign competitors, the number of sectors
where foreign firms are technologically far ahead of the local firms decreases, i.e. µ1t+1 increases.
Since the innovation efforts of foreign firms in technologically dispersed sectors are lower (equations
(41)), the smaller number of these sectors in the economy raises aggregate productivity growth.
This can be directly seen from the distribution of productivity gaps:
µ˙ =


−µ1t+1xF1t + xHt(1− µ1t+1) ∆ = 1,
(xF∆t + xHt)µ∆t+1 + xF∆tµ∆−1,t+1 ∆ ≥ 2
For the distribution to be stationary, µ˙ = 0 and therefore µ1 =
xH
xF1+xH
. As ∂µ1∂τ < 0, a decrease in
the distortion in the access to capital markets raises the fraction of µ1 sectors and decreases the
fraction of sectors where foreign firms are technologically far ahead of their local competitors.
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Appendix C Financial System’s Supervisory Framework
In Hungary, the deregulation of the foreign exchange market implied the amendment of other
complementary laws in order to guarantee a stable and well-functioning financial system. In the
new open economy regime, some earlier regulations became obsolete and needed to be adjusted to
the new forms of capital flows.
More precisely, one of the changes introduced by FX Act XCIII was the liberalization of cross-
border securities in foreign currency (as derivatives). The use of these securities needed some
regulation, as these are key tools in the risk management of banks and, hence, in the stability
of the financial system. The amendment of the Capital Market Act (Act CXX of 2001) filled
this gap and regulated the scope of these instruments for financial institutions. Additionally,
the deregulation of the FX market required the regulation of clearing houses that trade foreign
currency, which thereafter were allowed to enter the market. This regulation was also included
in the amendment to the Capital Market Act (see Capital Market Act 2001). Another challenge
posed by the financial liberalization was the adjustment of the supervisory framework of financial
institutions, as thereafter they could trade foreign currency instruments and, hence, be exposed to
currency risk in various ways. Financial institutions’ exposure was regulated in the amendments to
the Capital Market Act and Credit Institution Act (CXII of 1996), which introduced consolidated
reporting and limited the overall currency exposure of financial groups (IMF 2002). The use of
financial derivatives in the insurance sector also requiered the amendment of the insurance act,
which "address[ed] the need for internal controls of the use of derivatives" of insurance companies
(IMF 2002, p.36).
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